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ERISA

ERISA: A CO-FIDUCIARY HAS NO RIGHT TO CONTRIBUTION AND
INDEMNITY
GEORGE LEE FLINT, JR.* AND PHILIP W. MOORE, JR.**

The plan administrators of a profit-sharing plan, governed by the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),' decided to invest a portion
of the plan assets in a residential real estate project.2 The plan administrators
sought and used the advice of a registered investment advisor in making the
investment. For a $100,000 investment the plan received two promissory notes
of a limited partnership, the entity owning the residential real estate. As part of
the transaction the executed escrow instructions with the escrow holder and the
trustee of the profit-sharing plan directed the escrow agent to deliver a recorded
deed of trust of the limited partnership to the trustee securing the promissory
notes. Neither the escrow agent nor the trustee recorded the deed of trust.
Consequently, when the limited partnership filed for reorganization under the
bankruptcy laws a few years later, the plan's investment became worthless since
the deeds of trust lacked recordation. After an investigation, the Department of
Labor determined that the fiduciaries of the plan had violated their duties under
ERISA to the plan and demanded that the fiduciaries restore to the plan the
money lost, the original investment plus imputed earnings thereon, as a result of
the breaches of fiduciary duties. The plan administrators settled with the
Department of Labor, and deposited the total money lost into the plan. The plan
administrators then brought suit against the other fiduciaries, 3 namely the
investment advisor, the escrow agent, and the trustee for contribution and
indemnity. The other fiduciaries moved for dismissal of the lawsuit. They had
no contractual obligation to provide contribution or indemnity.
A payor can recover reimbursement under a theory of contribution or a
theory of indemnity, not both.4 But since litigants often do not know in advance
whether their evidence for one or the other will convince a fact finder, they sue
* H. Andy Professor of Commercial Law, St. Mary's University School of Law, San
Antonio, Texas;
B.A., 1966, B.S., 1966, M.A., 1968, University of Texas at Austin; Nuc. E., 1969, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology; Ph.D. (Physics), 1973, J.D., 1975, University of Texas at Austin.
.. Associate at Smith DeFeo, P.C., Dallas, Texas; B.S., 1998, University of Houston;
J.D., 2001, St.
Mary's University School of Law.
1. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829
(1974) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 29 U.S.C. (1999)).
2. See generally Call v. Sumitomo Bank of Calif., 881 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1989).
3. ERJSA contains a broad definition of fiduciary. See infra notes 110-122 and accompanying
text. Thus, even service providers run the risk of fiduciary status. See, e.g., Chapman v. Klemick, 750
F. Supp. 520, 524 (S.D. Fla. 1990). Here, the court found the beneficiary's attorney to be a plan
fiduciary where attorney advised client not to pay insurance recoveries under subrogation agreement
with plan since beneficiary was judgment proof and could declare bankruptcy, thus deterring the plan
from suing under the subrogation agreement. Id. Because of the broad definition, ERISA has no need to
permit suits against non-fiduciaries participating in the breach with fiduciaries. See infra note Ill and
accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
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for both. For this reason this article refers to the two in the conjunctive, rather
than the disjunctive, except where it is obvious which one is meant.
Contribution and indemnity may be a contractual obligation or imposed by a
court without agreement. 5 This article deals with contribution and indemnity as
remedies implied-by a court without an agreement. So this article uses the terms
"contribution" and "indemnity" to refer to the court imposed remedies rather
than a contractual remedy, except in the few instances where it is obvious a
contractual remedy is meant by using contractual-related terminology.
Most Americans would not give this lawsuit a second thought. They would
allow this lawsuit for contribution and indemnity and so deny the motion for
dismissal. Their concept of fairness requires that those that did the dastardly
deed should bear the loss. 6 The American system of justice reflects numerous
instances where individuals pay the liability of feasors, usually due to some sort
of relationship with the feasor, to insure recovery by the victim and then seek
reimbursement from the feasor.7 This means
the impact of the insolvency of the
8
feasor falls on the payor, not the victim.

Federal law, however, is not so quick to allow contribution and indemnity
when the statute does not contain a provision expressly authorizing such0
implication. 9 Many believe ERISA does not contain such a provision.
Congress may have had some other policy ground for ERISA that overrides our
sense that feasors should pay for their deeds. So the issue for the court in the
above scenario is whether Congress in passing ERISA intended to provide for
the remedy of contribution and indemnity or whether Congress had in mind
some overriding policy.
One of the most significant unresolved questions is the extent to which
ERISA incorporates traditional trust law remedies." The major issue over which
parties have litigated this subject involves the right of a breaching ERISA
fiduciary to obtain contribution and indemnity from other defendant or potential
defendant fiduciaries, as provided by that traditional trust law.' 2 Federal courts
14
3
in the various circuits have split over this issue.' So have the commentators.
5. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
6. See, e.g., Elizabeth A. Di Cola, Fairnessand Efficiency: Allowing Contribution Under ERISA,
80 CAL. L. REV. 1543, 1562-63 (1992) (explaining the fairness principle as the reason for adopting
contribution and indemnity under certain tort-related fields); see also infra note 94 and accompanying

text.
7. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 51, at
341-42 (W. Page Keeton ed., 1984) (noting feasor liability to one vicariously liable for indemnity), § 69,
at 499-501 (noting vicarious liability imposed on innocent defendant).
8. The definition of insolvency considers judgment proof individuals as insolvent. See, e.g., 11
U.S.C. § 101(32)(A) (1993) (excluding exempt property from the determination that debts exceed assets
for insolvency).
9. See infra notes 52-70 and accompanying text.
10. See infra note 233 and accompanying text. This article does not agree. ERISA uses other
terminology than the words "contribution" and "indemnity," namely "an agreement... to relieve a
fiduciary from.., liability." See infra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
11. Robert Eccles, FiduciaryLitigation under ERISA, 492 PRACTICING LAW INSTITuTE/TAX 365,
428 (2001).
12. Id. at 431.
13. See infra notes 234-94 and accompanying text.
14. See infra notes 295-343 and accompanying text.
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The Supreme Court has yet to consider the issue.
This article resolves the matter. The first section describes the historical
development of contribution and indemnity, from a contractual obligation to a
court implied obligation followed by an expansion to various federally regulated
fields. The second section investigates the ERISA fiduciary sections, their
differences with traditional trust law, their legislative history, and the purposes
of ERISA. The third section examines the position of the various federal courts
on the issue of contribution or indemnity and their rationales, along with that of
the commentators. Since ERISA generally does not permit actions against nonfiduciaries,' 5 this article excludes those opinions dealing with contribution and
indemnity between a fiduciary and a non-fiduciary, most of which appeared prior
to the Supreme Court's pronouncement with respect to non-fiduciaries. The
fourth section provides the solution pursuant to the Supreme Court's directive
for finding contribution and indemnity for a federal statute, finds that the
statutory language does not support contribution and indemnity, and shows that
the solution of disallowing contribution and indemnity comports with the
legislative history and the purposes of ERISA.
I. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY
Contribution and indemnification as remedies of traditional trust law, and
hence equitable remedies, developed in the nineteenth century.' 6 Traditional
trust law uses joint and several liability to provide a greater chance that the trust
17
will recover the loss without concern about an insolvent breaching trustee.
Under federal statutes, the presence of joint and several liability does not
necessarily mean that contribution and indemnity serve as remedies. 18 After the
trust's recovery from the paying trustee, that traditional trust law uses
contribution to apportion the paying trustee's loss amongst all trustees having
some degree of culpability with the paying trustee bearing its proportionate share
of the loss. 19 Traditional trust law uses indemnification to reimburse the paying
trustee for all of its loss where the other trustees' culpability is substantially
greater than the paying trustee. 20 The risk of an insolvent trustee merely means
the paying trustee does not recover from that trustee.21
Roman law recognized contribution and indemnity for surety law. Roman
surety law involved a contractual relationship.22 Since Roman law provided that
15.
16.

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.

17. See 3A AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §
258, at 399 (4th ed. 1988); GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT & GEORGE TAYLOR BOGERT, THE LAW OF

TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 701, at 195 (West Publishing Co., rev. 2d ed. 1995).
18. See Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981) (noting the
anti-trust laws).
19. SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 17, § 258, at 399-401; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 17, §
701, at 195-96.
20.

SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 17, § 258, at 401-03; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 17, §

701, at 197.
21. SCOTt & FRATCHER, supra note 17, § 258.1, at 401.
22. See 10 SAMUEL P. SCOTT, THE CIVIL LAW (Central Trust Co., reprinted 1973), 145
(Justinian's Digest Bk. 45, Tit. 2, Law 19), 155 (Justinian's Digest Bk. 46, Tit. 1, Law 1), 170

SOUTH DAKOTA LA WREVIEW

[Vol. 48

a lawsuit by a creditor extinguished the debt, substituting the judgment, risk of
insolvency lay with the creditor and his choice of proceeding against the debtor
or one of the sureties.2 3 If the creditor sued the surety, that surety had to satisfy
the debt without having any recourse against the co-sureties or the original
debtor.24 To mitigate this result Hadrian allowed sureties to plead the benefit of
division and thereby limit their liability to their "pro rata share, determined by
the number of solvent sureties at the time of the peremptory plea., 25 The risk of
an insolvent surety after the plea still lay with the creditor but the creditor could
go against each one individually for their share.26
A. THE ENGLISH

DEVELOPMENT OF CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY

In adopting the Roman concept of contribution and indemnity, AngloAmerican jurisprudence developed two strands since England had more than one
set of courts. One strand appeared in the Chancery and so provides an equitable
remedy. The other appeared in the Kings Bench and Common Pleas Courts, the
common law courts, and so provides a legal remedy. These two strands have
differing rules concerning how they apply these two remedies. The most notable
difference is the absence of a right to a jury trial in equity 27 and the refusal to
enforce penalties in equity. 28 A court could view shifting the loss to a
defalcating fiduciary under ERISA through contribution as a penalty for
improper behavior and so deny this equitable remedy.
Traditional trust law, and hence ERISA, is an equitable field and uses
equitable principles rather than legal principles. However, for ERISA most of
the American courts and commentators ignore the distinction between equitable
and legal contribution and indemnity, and hence differing rules, probably
because they focused on whether such remedies are available under ERISA,
rather than applying the remedy to a particular ERISA fiduciary.29
English courts enforced contribution and indemnity agreements, both by

(Justinian's Digest Bk. 46, Tit. 1, Law 60); see generally Philip K. Jones, Jr., Roman Law Bases of
Suretyship in Some Modern Civil Codes, 52 TULANE L. REV. 129, 130 (1977).
23. See Jones, supra note 22, at 133.
24. See Id.
25. See SCOTT, supra note 22, at 162 (Justinian's Digest Bk. 46, Tit. 1, Law 26), 168 (Justinian's
Digest Bk. 46, Tit. 1, Law 51); Jones, supra note 22, at 133-34.
26. See SCOTT, supra note 22, at 134 (Bk. 46, Tit. 1, Law 51(4)); Jones, supra note 22, at 134.
27.

See, e.g.,

1 JOHN NORTON

POMEROY,

A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE

AS

ADMINISTERED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Bancroft-Whitney Co., 5th ed. 1941), § 358a
(stating that at law uses jury, equity uses judge). Compare Brock v. Group Legal Adm'rs, Inc., 702 F.
Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (holding no jury trial for contribution and indemnity for ERISA trust),
with Nat'l Farmers Union Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Nelson, 147 N.W.2d 839, 844-45 (Iowa 1967) (noting that
for third-party claim for contribution and indemnity for auto collision it is the duty of the jury to find
facts and of the court to determine right of contribution or indemnity as a matter of law).
28. See, e.g., Pomeroy, supra note 27, § 72 (explaining doctrine that equity abhors enforcement of
penalties). See also Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981) (giving
the penalty aspect as the reason for the refusal to extend contribution and indemnity to violations under
the federal anti-trust laws).
29. See, e.g., Paul James Hunt, Note, Bucking the Trend: An Argument in Favor of a Fiduciary's
Implied Right to Contribution Under ERISA, 76 VA. L. REV. 1377, 1396 (1990) (describing contribution

as equitable, but citing tort cases) id at 1397 n. 127 (again describing contribution as equitable, but citing
a tort article that refers to jury trial and punishing feasors, both not tolerated in a court of equity).
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contract and implied contracts, by the seventeenth century, both for surety law in
31
°
the Chancery equitably 3 and for tort law in the common law courts at law.
Extending contribution and indemnity to situations without the agreement did
not occur early. English surety law in the Chancery recognized contribution
without the agreement by 1787.32 But the effort to extend contribution to torts
without the agreement in the common law courts failed in 1799. 33 In the early
nineteenth century, the Chancery based on its surety law precedence, extended
contribution to traditional trust law. 34 By mid-nineteenth century, the Chancery
also recognized indemnity without an agreement for the inactive trustee.35
Courts in the United States followed these three developments of denying both
remedies for torts and allowing both for trusts.36 So contribution and indemnity
without an agreement developed first as an equitable remedy.
Since equity had exclusive jurisdiction over traditional trust law,37 after the
recognition of contribution and indemnification for a jointly and severally liable
fiduciary, the Chancery began to develop rules for the remedy.3 8 Equity
distinguished between unintentional and intentional wrongs. So liability for an
innocent breach of trust created the right to contribution, while liability for an
intentional or fraudulent breach of trust, an equitable wrong in the nature of a
tort to which the tort rule of no contribution analogously applied, did not. 39 For
30. See, e.g., Hale v. Harrison, 22 Eng. Rep. 783 (1675); Swain v. Wall, 21 Eng. Rep. 534 (1642);
Morgan v. Seymour, 21 Eng. Rep. 525 (1638); Peter v. Rich, 21 Eng. Rep. 499 (1630); Fleetwood v.
Charnock, 21 Eng. Rep. 117 (Ch. 1629).
31. See Battersey's Case, Winch. 48, 124 Eng. Rep. 41, s.c. sub. nom. Fletcher v. Harcot, Hutton
55, 123 Eng. Rep. 1097 (C.P. 1622) (implied); Martyn v. Blythman, Yelv. 197, 80 Eng. Rep. 130 (K.B.
1611) (actual); see generally Note, Contribution- Right of Recovery Inter Sese Between Wrongdoers, 21
VA. L. REV. 551 (1935); W. Page Keeton, supranote 7, at 341.
32. See Dering v. Earl of Winchelsea, 29 Eng. Rep. 1184, 1185 (1787) (contribution even without
knowledge of the co-surety's contract); see also Craythorne v. Swinburne, 33 Eng. Rep. 482 (Ch. 1807)
(right to contribution either on a principle of equity or contract).
33. See Merrywether v. Nixon, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799); see also Philips v. Biggs, 145
Eng. Rep. 433 (Exch. 1659) (court doubted one could obtain contribution for a tort judgment); W. Page
Keeton, supra note 7, at 336.
34. See Lingard v. Bromley, 35 Eng. Rep. 45 (Ch. 1812) (bill for contribution); see also Perry v.
Knott, 49 Eng. Rep. 307 (Ch. 1841); see generally Note, Right of ContributionAmong Co-Trustees, 22
VA. L. REV. 804 (1936) (noting that surety law provided the source of the rule). See Lingard,35 Eng.
Rep. at 46 (citing only surety cases for the proposition); Robinson v. Harkin, [1896] 2 Ch. 415 (applied
to sureties, then to co-trustees).
35. See Lincoln v. Wright, 49 Eng. Rep. 404 (Ch. 1841); see also Thompson v. Finch, 44 Eng.
Rep. 506, s.c. 52 Eng. Rep. 1130 (Ch. 1856) (allowing indemnity when the indemnitor also served as the
trust's solicitor); Lockhart v. Reilly, 44 Eng. Rep. 803 (Ch. 1857) (allowing indemnity when the
indemnitor also served as the trust's solicitor); see also Bakin v. Hughes, [1895] 31 Ch. 390, 395
(identifying the first two indemnity cases as Thompson and Lockhart).
36. See W. Page Keeton, supra note 7, at 557 n.35. For contribution under trust law, see BOGERT
& BOGERT, supra note 17, § 862, at 43-48; SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 17, § 258, at 399-401. For
indemnity under trust law, see BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 17, § 701, at 196; SCOTT & FRATCHER,
supra note 17, §§ 258.1 & 258.2, at 401-405.
37. The common law recognizes "no action for breach of trust." See Note, supra note 34, at 806.
38. This article does not intend to provide a complete discussion of the equity rules for contribution
and indemnity for trusts. It merely attempts to indicate that these rules, developed by the Chancery, have
a separate origin from the rules for contribution and indemnity of the at law courts and are generally
different from those at law court rules. Thus, the rules developed for torts under the at law courts do not
necessarily apply for trust law.
39. See Attorney General v. Wilson, 41 Eng. Rep. 389 (Ch. 1842); see also American Bonding Co.
of Baltimore v. Richardson, 214 F. 897 (6th Cir. 1914); In re Mallon's Estate, 89 N.Y.S. 554 (1905);
Lathan v. Blakemore, 51 Tenn. 276 (4 Heisk.) (1871). For other nuances between equitable contribution
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indemnity the Chancery required liability for an innocent breach seeking
indemnity from a dishonest co-trustee that received a profit, 40 or from a co41

trustee serving as the trust's solicitor.
American pronouncements of the traditional trust law for contribution and
indemnity do not always follow these nuances. 42
One well-respected
commentator asserts that the merely negligent trustee can recover indemnity
from an active co-trustee, without requiring dishonesty or solicitor status. 43 This
situation generally results in contribution. 44
Another well-respected
commentator neglects the element of profit by the dishonest co-trustee before the
other co-trustee can recover indemnity and as a result can not explain when
courts will grant indemnity. 45 The source of the confusion lies in trying to use in
trust law the rules for contribution and indemnity developed subsequently by the
at law courts for torts.
B. THE AMERICAN EXPANSION OF CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY

In the twentieth century contribution and indemnity without agreement
spread to various non-equitable fields in the United States, both by courts
implying the action and by statute. These legal fields generally encompass torts,
both under state law and various federal statutes. For state tort law eventually

and legal contribution, see Robert A. Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between Joint Tortfeasors, 81
U. PA. L. REv. 130, 135 (1932) (noting origin in equity and adopted by at law courts; modem trend to
meld, with at law courts adopting the in equity rules) & n. 21 (citing texts for other nuances) id. at 22
(stating at law divided by number of all feasors, in equity divided by number of solvent feasors; at law
did not survive death of feasor, in equity did).
40. See Wynne v. Tempest, [1897] 1 Ch. 110; In re Parlington, 57 L.T.R. 654 (Ch. 1888); see also
Waters v. Waters, 148 A. 326, 327 (Conn. 1930) (tort law differs considerably on this point, requiring
only that the indemnitor be active and the indemnitee, passive). See, e.g., Kuhn v. Gen. Parking Corp.,
424 N.E.2d 941, 947 (111. App. 1981); accord United States Lines, Inc. v. Newport News Shipbuilding &
Dry Dock Co., 688 F.2d 236, 240-41 (4th Cir. 1982) (applying tort rule to maritime law); see also Joiner
v. Diamond M. Drilling Co., 688 F.2d 256, 261-62 (5th Cir. 1982) (Lousiana law: describing the test as
fault, no fault); Houdaille Indus., Inc. v. Edwards, 374 S.2d 490,492-94 (Fla. 1979) (same).
41. See In re Lindsey, [1904] 2 Ch. 785; In re Turner [1897] 1 Ch. 536; In re Parlington, 57 L.T.R.
654 (Ch. 1888); Price v. Price, 42 T.L.R. 626 (Ch. 1880). For nuances between at law implied
indemnity and in equity implied indemnity, see infta notes 27-28 & 39-41 and accompanying text. The
modem trend is similar for contribution with courts adopting the at law rules. But the important
distinction relates to equity's reluctance to enforce penalties. See Note, supra note 34, at 807
(reimbursement alone is a penalty, so equitable indemnity requires unjust enrichment, a profit).
42. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 258 & 258(a) (1959). "[W]here two trustees are liable
to the beneficiary for a breach of trust, each of them is entitled to contribution from the other, except that
if one of them is substantially more at fault than the other, he is not entitled to contribution from the
other but the other is entitled to indemnity from him..."). Id. Prominent law school faculty designed
the restatements for the major fields of law to condense the rules of law into a powerful logic that would
convince appellate judges of the correctness of the position of the restatements. See KERMIT L. HALL,
THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 269 (1989). Although some appellate judges cite
them, they do not represent legal authority. See Id. at 269. In fact, they are sometimes counter to the
majority rule of the courts. Compare RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 230 (1930) (stating
the position of classical contract theory on interpretation - use the objective meaning of a reasonable
person) with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 201 (1981) (stating the position of
neoclassical contract theory on interpretation - use subjective intent of the parties).
43. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 17, § 862, at 45-47; see also Note, supra note 34, at 807.
44. See Robinson v. Hankin, [1896] 2 Ch. 415; Bahin v. Hughes, 31 Ch. D. 390, 396 (1886); see
also Marsh v. Harrington, 18 Verm. 148 (1846).
45. See SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 17, § 258.1, at 401-403 (unable to explain when
indemnity arises); see also Note, supra note 34, at 807.
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nine jurisdictions recognized contribution and indemnity by case law,46 followed
by other states with statutory authorization, including some under the uniform
statutes such as the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939, 47 the
Revised Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1955,48 and the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act of 1977. 49 This state law also governs claims
under federal statutes that do not preempt state law. So courts have recognized
contribution and indemnity for the Lanham Act 50 and the Federal Employer's
Liability Act.5'
1. Expansion to Various Legal Fields
Under preemptive federal law the courts and Congress also have achieved
recognition of contribution and indemnity. Federal courts have implied these
remedies for negligent actions under admiralty law 52 and aviation law. 53 But as

in earlier England, the courts have refused to extend contribution and indemnity
to other non-negligence, tort-related fields, such as employment discrimination,54
civil rights violations,5 5 false claims,56 commodities fraud,57 and anti-trust

46. See Keeton, supra note 7, at 337 (listing California, D.C., Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota,
Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Wisconsin); see also WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 220-21 (Harvard University Press, 1987) (listing eight states by
court decision, 39 by statute, and 6 with no contribution); Note, supra note 31, at 558 (listing eleven
states).
47. 12 U.L.A. 185-93 (1996) (adopted in Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada,
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and Tennessee).
48. 12 U.L.A. 194-290 (1996).
49. 12 U.L.A. 123-53 (1996) (adopted in Iowa and Washington).
50. See Transdermal Prods., Inc. v. Performance Contract Packaging, Inc., 943 F. Supp. 551, 554
(E.D. Pa. 1996) (Pennsylvania law for contribution under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (1997));
contra Santano Products, Inc. v. Bobrick Washroom Equip., Inc., 69 F.2d Supp. 678 (M.D. Pa. 1999)
(N.Y. law does not allow contribution or indemnity under the Lanham Act); see also Getty Petroleum
Corp. v. Island Transp. Corp., 862 F.2d 10, 16 (2d Cir. 1988) ("no federal common law of contribution"
under the Lanham Act), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1006 (1989).
51. See Ellison v. Shell Oil Co., 882 F.2d 349, 352 (9th Cir. 1989) (indemnity, California law
under the Federal Employer's Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1986)); Armstrong v. Kansas City S. Ry.
Co., 752 F.2d 1110, 1114 (5th Cir. 1985) (indemnity, Louisiana law); Alabama Great Southern R.R. Co.
v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry Co., 493 F.2d 979, 973 (8th Cir. 1974) (indemnity, Mississippi law); see
also Grunenthal v. Long Island R.R. Co., 388 F.2d 480, 482 (2d Cir. 1968) (denied indemnity under
N.Y. law), rev'don other grounds, 393 U.S. 156 (1968).
52. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511 U.S. 202 (1994) (noting settlement bar rule for
contribution for negligent design of equipment); United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397
(1975) (citing contribution under the Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 741 (1975), the Jones Act, 46
U.S.C. § 688 (1975), and the Death on High Seas Act, § 6, 46 U.S.C. § 766 (1975), for negligent
collision of vessels); Cooper Stevedoring Co., Inc. v. Fritz Kopke, Inc., 417 U.S. 106, 110-15 (1974)
(finding contribution under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act, 33 U.S.C. §
905 (1986), for negligent cargo loading). The Supreme Court supplied the reason that it was correcting
its mid-nineteenth century opinions following the then English rule for equal division of damages,
internationally rejected by the Brussells Convention of 1910, and so did not need Congressional
direction. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. at 401-02, 410.
53. See, e.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504 F.2d 400, 405 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421
U.S. 978 (1975) (noting contribution and indemnity under the Federal Aviation Act, §101, 49 U.S.C. §
1301 (1997) (amended 2002), for negligent mid-air collision).
54. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union of America, 451 U.S. 77, 90 (1981)
(stating that no contribution under the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 201 (1998), for intentional wage
differentials violating the statute).
55. See id. (recognizing contribution under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
(1994), for intentional wage differentials violating the statute).
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violations.58 The reason for the different treatment lies in whether the body of
law is designed to compensate victims for negligent acts, such as with tort law,
or whether that design is to punish intentional acts, such as with anti-trust
violations. 59 The early American tort cases made the same distinction: allowing
contribution for negligence and denying it for willful
acts. 60 This same
61
law.
distinction occurred in the equitable field of trust
Congressional design for the statute, however, can reverse the result. This
has occurred for both the securities laws and the environmental laws. Both
fields have some statutory contribution provisions. Congress expressly created
the contribution right 62 and the indemnification right 63 in certain securities

situations. In other situations dealing with fraud the courts have created the
right.64 However, under the 1933 act, the Securities and Exchange Commission
has an anti-indemnification policy. 65 Consequently, some courts have refused to
enforce indemnification agreements under the 1933 act regardless of
culpability. 66 Similarly, courts have found contribution denied under the Trust
Indenture Act.6 7
Congress originally did not expressly provide for the right to contribution

56. See Mortgages Inc. v. United States District Court for the District of Nevada, Las Vegas, 934
F.2d 209 (9th Cir. 1991) (providing no contribution or indemnity under the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§ 3729 (1983), for intentional fraud which bears treble damages).
57. See Fleming v. Lind-Waldeck & Co., 922 F.2d 20, 28 (1st Cir. 1990) (noting contribution
under the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 1 (1999), for intentional fraud based on legislative
history); see also Hearings on S. 2578, S. 2837 and H.R. 13113 Before the Senate Comm. on Agriculture
and Forestry, pt. 3, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 679, 683 (1974) (quoting testimony of Prof. Glenn Clark
describing the naked commodity option scandal of 1973 as fraud, a swindle, and a nefarious scheme).
58. See Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 646 (1981) (stating no
contribution under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1997) and the Clayton Anti-Trust Act, 15
U.S.C. § 12 (1997), for intentional price fixing conspiracy, which bears treble damages).
59. See id. at 635 "[T]o invoke principles of equity presuppose a legislative intent to allow parties
violating the law to draw upon equitable principles to mitigate the consequences of their wrongdoing."
"[Tlraditional equitable standards have something to say about the septic state of the hands of such a
suitor in the courts." Id. at 639. "The very idea of treble damages reveals an intent to punish... not to
ameliorate the liability of wrongdoers." Id.
60. Compare Thweatt's Adm'r v. Jones, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 328 (1823) (holding contribution
available for mistake) with Peck v. Ellis, 2 Johns. Ch. 131 (N.Y.Ch. 1816) (holding no contribution for
willful acts); see also KEETON, supra note 7, at 337.
61. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1997) (filing of false registration statements under § 11 of the 1933
act); id. § 78i(e) (manipulation of securities prices under § 9 of the 1934 act); id. § 78r(b)
(misrepresentations in Securities and Exchange filings under § 18 of the 1934 act); id. § 78u-4(f) (for
class actions under § 11 of the 1933 act and under the 1934 act).
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 77ooo(d)(2) (for indenture trustee against its own officers under § 315 of the
Trust Indenture Act); see also LNC Invs., Inc. v. First Fid. Bank, Nat'l Ass'n, 935 F. Supp. 1333, 1344
(S.D.N.Y. 1996) (holding no implied contribution by collateral trustee against trustee).
64. See, e.g., Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286, 292-93 (1993)
(discussing securities fraud under rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (2001) since the court can delineate
the remedies for an implied cause of action); Nelson v. Quimby Island Reclamation Dist. Facilities
Corp., 491 F. Supp. 1364, 1383 (N.D. Cal. 1980) (discussing fraud in a prospectus or oral
communication under § 12(2) of the 1933 act); Globus, Inc. v. Law Research Serv., Inc., 318 F. Supp.
955, (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd442 F. 2d 1346 (2d Cir. 1971) (for fraud under § 17 of the 1933 act due to
"general drift of the law today. .. toward allowance of contribution amongst joint tortfeasors").
65. 17 C.F.R. § 229.512(i) (2001).
66. See, e.g., Eichenholtz v Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 485 (3d Cir. 1995).
67. See LNC Invs., Inc., 935 F. Supp. at 1344 (discussing no implied contribution by collateral
trustee against trustee).
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under the environmental laws. 68 Nonetheless courts implied such a right from
the legislative history, which spoke of liability governed by traditional principles
liability.69 Since then,
of the evolving common law for joint and several
70
statutorily.
Congress has provided for contribution
2. JurisprudentialCriticism of the Expansion to Various Legal Fields
Recently, contribution in a non-equitable field, namely torts, has come
under assault by the law-and-economics jurisprudential school. 71 The law-andeconomics jurisprudential school concluded that in the tort context, a legal
remedy, the contribution rule is inefficient. Both the contribution rule and noncontribution rule possess the same deterrent effect, with tortfeasors comporting
their actions to a socially optimal level of care to minimize their expected
administrative costs due to additional
costs. 72 But the contribution rule increases
73
court proceedings to allocate the liability.

This criticism, however, does not extend to indemnity. The studies of the
law-and-economics jurisprudential school indicate that the indemnity rule is
economically optimum.7 4 Tort law uses several tests to determine whether to

indemnify. All three tests examined by the law-and-economics jurisprudential
school shift the loss to the least-cost joint tortfeasor, the one who can avoid the
that the
act for the least cost. 75 One of the purposes of ERISA is to make sure
76
costs of administration do not deter plan formation and continuation.
The law-and-economics jurisprudential school further criticize the
contribution rule since it also increases administrative costs by reducing the
likelihood of settlement.77 Under the contribution rule, the settlement does not
bar a court from determining further liability in a subsequent lawsuit. 78 So the

contribution

rule encourages

litigation, while

the non-contribution

79
encourages settlement, reducing administrative costs.

rule

68. See Ellen J. Garber, Federal Common Law of Contribution Under the 1986 CERCLA
Amendments, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 365 (1987).
69.. See, e.g., United States v. New Castle County, 642 F. Supp. 1258, 1266-67 (D. Del. 1986);
United States v. Conservation Chemical Co., 619 F. Supp. 162, 199 (W.D. Mo. 1985), rejected by 810
F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1987); Wehner v. Syntex Agribusiness, Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 31 (E.D. Mo. 1985);
Colorado v. Asarco, Inc., 608 F. Supp. 1484, 1486 (D. Colo. 1985). The legislative history referred to
liability issues to be handled by traditional principles of evolving common law with the example ofjoint
and several liability. See 126 CONG. REC. S 14,964 (statement of Sen. Randolph), S 14,980 (statement of
Sen. Cohen), & S 15,004 (daily ed. Nov. 24, 1980) (statement of Sen. Helms).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f) (2000) (under Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) of 1980 § 113, as amended).
71. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 46, 201-204.
72. See id at 196.
73. See id. at 201-02.
74. See id.at 205-210.
75. See id. at 205-09. The three tests include the active-passive negligence test, the impliedcontractual immunity test, and the primary versus secondary liability test. Id.
76. See infra notes 226-27 and accompanying text.
77. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 46, at 202-03.
78. See id. at 202; see also Byrnes v. Phoenix Assurance Co. of N.Y., 303 F.2d 649, 652-53 (7th
Cir. 1962) (non-settling defendants can seek contribution); KEETON, supra note 7, at 340 (same).
79. See Frank H. Easterbrook, William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Contribution Among
Antitrust Defendants: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 23 J.L. & ECON. 331, 362 (1980).
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To avoid the perceived deterrent to settlement of the contribution rule, some
jurisdictions have adopted a rule barring further recovery against the settling
tortfeasor 80 and allowing a reduction in the subsequent judgment against the nonsettling tortfeasors. 8' The courts perform the judgment reduction under one of
three methods: (1) pro rata, in which the court divides the judgment by the
number of settling and non-settling tortfeasors with the non-settling tortfeasors
paying their portion, (2) pro tanto, in which the court reduces the judgment
dollar for dollar by the amount of the settlement, and (3) proportionate, in which
the non-settling tortfeasor pays its respective percentage of the judgment. 82 The
three methods of judgment reduction correspond to the three versions of
statutory contribution. 83 The pro rata method belongs to the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939, the pro tanto method belongs to
the Revised Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1955, and the
proportional method belongs to the Uniform Comparative Fault Act of 1977.84
The bar rule eliminates the settlement objection to contribution. Consequently,
courts have extended
the settlement bar rule to the equitable remedies of
85
traditional trust law.
Criticism of the law-and-economics jurisprudential school's conclusion
claims the assumptions of the tort analysis to not hold in the real world. 6 Two
of those assumptions, that all litigants have perfect information and all
defendants are solvent, 87 do not apply to ERISA fiduciary breaches. Firstly,
ERISA fiduciaries often do not have sufficient information to calculate the
benefit of breach.88 Secondly, they may have difficulty anticipating the standard
of care the court might impose. 89 Thirdly, they may have difficulty calculating
the probability of getting caught and losing at trial. 90 Fourthly, they may have
difficulty estimating the potential liability if plaintiff prevails. Fifthly, they may
have difficulty determining the likelihood that the co-fiduciaries will avoid

80. See, e.g., The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act § 4, 12 U.L.A. 264 (2002)
(allowing escape from contribution for settlement with a proportionate rule).
81. See In re Jiffy Lube Securities Litigation, 927 F.2d 155, 160 (4th Cir. 1991).
82. See id. at 160 n.3.
83. See Thomas V. Harris, Washington's Unique approach to Partial Tort Settlements: The
Modified Pro Tanto Credit and the Reasonableness HearingRequirement, 20 GONGZAGA L. REV. 69,
77-78 (1985).
84. See supra notes 47-49 for these three statutes.
85. See In re Masters Mates & Pilots Pension Plan and IRAP Litigation, 957 F.2d 1020, 1028 (2d
Cir. 1992).
86. See Lewis A. Komhouser & Richard L. Revesz, Sharing Damages Among Multiple
Tortfeasors, 98 YALE L. J. 831, 837-40 (1989) (challenging the assumptions that: (1) a feasor is liable
for the full loss caused; (2) feasors pay for damages attributable to non-negligent actors; (3) damages are
apportioned equally among feasors on a per capita basis; and (4) courts apply a socially optimal standard
of care); see also Lewis A. Kornhouser & Richard L. Revesz, Settlements Under Joint and Several
Liability, 68 N.Y.UNIv. L. REv. 427,491-92 (1993).
87. See Di Cola, supra note 6, at 1557 (citing Jong G. Yi, Litigation with Multiple Defendants:
How to Settle Under Different Apportionment Rules 18-20, Stanford University Center for Economic
Policy Research Publication, No. 225. (1990).
88. Due to the fractionalization of fiduciaries, see infra notes 110-122 and accompanying text.
89. The standard is that of experts, which many of the fiduciaries are not. See infra notes 129-30
and accompanying text.
90. Other fiduciaries are supposed to monitor and may be liable for not monitoring. See infra note
138 and accompanying text.
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liability. 91 Sixthly, they may have difficulty making the risk assessments of the
co-fiduciaries. 92 Many small employers have employee benefit plans. These

plans frequently have individuals serve as fiduciaries. The same holds true for
some types of the fractionalized fiduciaries. Many of these individuals are not
necessarily capable of paying large judgments.93
These criticisms of the law-and-economics jurisprudential school of course
apply to torts, a legal field. Trust law and ERISA fiduciary breaches are
equitable and so concerns for natural justice enter. 94 These considerations must
have born heavily on Judge Richard Posner, the leading proponent of the lawand-economics jurisprudential school criticism of contribution for torts. So
much so that when he considered contribution in an ERISA case, rather than
respond with this criticism, he "assumed" ERISA allowed contribution. 95 So
even the leading critic of contribution for torts refused to reverse his Circuit's
recognition of contribution and indemnity for ERISA on the basis of this
6
9

criticism.

II. ERISA FIDUCIARY LAW
Fiduciary law for an ERISA plan differs considerably from that for
traditional trusts. The English developed traditional trust law for donative
transfers.9 7 The law for retirement plans started from a donative background but
only because early jurists, mindful of new business developments, initially
experimented with analogous bodies of law. They toyed with the idea that the

retirement plan constituted a "gift" from the employer.98 The gratuity theory
continued into the 1950's, most notably in New York. 99 But before ERISA's
passage, jurists came to identify the retirement benefit promise with the law of
contracts, 100 so much so that the Supreme Court once described pre-ERISA law
as contractual. 10 Jurists had recognized that the retirement benefit promise
arose in the employment context. Never the less, some pre-ERISA jurists used
91. There are many fiduciaries and they have different tests for insulation against liability. See
infra notes 140-43, and accompanying text.
92. See Di Cola, supra note 6, at 1560-61.
93. See id.at 1559-60.
94. See RICHARD POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 404-05(Harvard University Press
1990) (describing at law matters as logical and objective, equity as ethical and subjective); see also infra
note 282 and accompanying text.
95. See Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1178 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner, J.).
96. See infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text for the Seventh Circuit's accceptance.
97. See S. REP. No. 93-127 at 29 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., 4838, 4865 ("[T]rust
law had developed in the context of testamentary and intervivos trusts (usually designed to pass
designated property to an individual or small group of persons) with an intendant emphasis on carrying
out the instructions of the settlor.") [hereinafter S. REP. No. 93-127]; H.R. REP. No. 93-533 at 11
(1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., 4639, 4650 (same) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 93-533].
98. See, e.g., McNevin v. Solvay Process Co., 53 N.Y. Supp. 98, 99-100 (1898), aff'dper curiam,
60 N.E. 1115 (1901) (establishing the gratuity theory for retirement plans).
99. See George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Jury Trial Mandatedfor Benefit Claims Actions, 25 LOY.
L.A. L. REv. 361, 410 & n. 279; see also id. at 410-11 (for experimentation with other theories).
100. Seeid. at374&n. 84,411 &n. 280.
101. See Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101, 112 (1989) ("Actions challenging an
employer's denial of benefits before the enactment of ERISA were governed by principles of contract
law.").

SOUTH DAKOTA LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 48

10 3
trust law, 10 2 mostly for plans under the Labor Management Relations Act,
since both that statute as well as the Internal Revenue Code required a trust for
the plans. 10 4 Consequently, ERISA calls for both a contractual plan and a

trust. 0 5 The historical significance of ERISA was to designate the employer

controlled parties, predominantly the plan administrator and the trustee, as
fiduciaries and to raise 0 their
behavioral standard above that of contract law to
6
fiduciaries.1
trust
of
that
In raising the standard of employee benefit plan fiduciaries Congress
deviated from traditional trust law for two main reasons. Employee benefit plans
have large numbers of participants and enormous amounts of money. l' v The
Supreme Court has recognized another reason, namely, ERISA fiduciaries
frequently have interests adverse to those of the beneficiaries.' 0 8 Consequently,
when fashioning the federal common law for ERISA's version of trust law, the
Supreme Court starts with traditional trust law and then varies it to fit the ERISA
situation weighing the two Congressional goals for ERISA to protect the benefits
of beneficiaries and to keep costs low enough so as not to discourage employers
from adopting plans.' 0 9
A. ERISA's STATUTORY FIDUCIARY PROVISIONS
ERISA possesses numerous provisions relating to fiduciaries. ERISA
defines a fiduciary to the plan broadly. A fiduciary of the plan is anyone who
exercises discretion over the management of the plan assets, renders investment
0
advice for compensation, or has discretion over the administration of the plan. "
So the fiduciary sections of ERISA only apply to these persons."'
102. See Flint, supra note 99, at 374 & n. 85, 411 & n. 281.
103. Taft-Hartley Act, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-187 (2000)).
104. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (1998); Revenue
Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 227, 247 (1923).
105. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, §§ 402 & 403, 29 U.S.C. §§
1102 (plan instrument) & 1103 (plan assets held in trust) (2000). See Flint, supra note 99, at 402-03
(delineating various provisions of ERISA recognizing the dual nature of employee benefit plans).
106. See Bruch, 489 U.S. at 110-11 ("ERISA's legislative history confirms that the Act's fiduciary
responsibility provisions.. .'codifqy] and mak[e] applicable to [ERISA] fiduciaries certain principles
developed in the evolution of the law of trusts."'); see also Tamar Frankel, FiduciaryLaw, 71 CAL. L.
REv. 795, 829 (1983) (explaining contract law as limited to the morals of the marketplace governed by
self-interest while fiduciary law requires the fiduciaries to act altruistically to further the interest of the
beneficiary in preference to their own).
107. See S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 97, at 34, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4869-70.
108
See Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211,225-26 (2000).
109. See Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 495 (1996); see also id. at 495 (raising the issue of when is
an employer a fiduciary); Curtiss-Wright Corp. v. Schoonejongen, 514 U.S. 73, 80-81 (1995) (describing
how an entity acts with intent); Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508 U.S. 248, 261 (1993) (noting no
liability for a non-fiduciary).
110. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21)
(1999); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, at 323 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5103
("[T]he definition includes persons who have authority and responsibility with respect to the matter in
question, regardless of their formal title.") [hereinafter H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280]; 29 C.F.R. §
2509.75-8 (2001) (Department of Labor regulation: does not include persons who perform purely
"ministerial" functions).

111.

See Mertens, 508 U.S. at 248 (1993) (drastically restricting the earlier tendencies of the courts

to develop non-fiduciary liability under ERISA); see also Munoz v. Prudential Insurance Co., 633 F.
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Due to the broad definition of fiduciary, ERISA specifies several types of
fiduciaries with different duties. In fact ERISA's structure encourages the
multiplicity of fiduciaries. ERISA requires the plan to provide for one or more
named fiduciaries "with authority to control and manage the operation and
administration of the plan."' " 2 Either the plan names the named fiduciary or the
3
The
plan sponsor, typically the employer, appoints the named fiduciary."
The
fiduciaries.
named fiduciary serves as the coordinator for all the other
named fiduciary has authority to appoint advisors to any other fiduciary and to
appoint investment advisors.' 14 These advisors will become fiduciaries if they5
of the plan."
exercise discretionary authority over the operations or assets
ERISA, however, singles out investment advisors as fiduciaries." 6 ERISA
divides the remaining fiduciaries into two groups. 1 7 The plan administrator or a
plan administrative committee handles the administration of the plan. 1 8 The

Supp. 564, 569 (D. Colo. 1986). In this case, state law bad faith processing claim against a mere
provider of administrative services, a non-fiduciary, was not preempted by ERISA. Id. The beneficiary
cannot successfully bring a bad faith processing claim against an ERISA fiduciary. Id. See Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) (noting that state claims for bad faith processing preempted by
ERISA).
112. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 402(a), 29 U.S.C. §
1102(a)(1)(1999).
113. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 402(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §
1102(a)(2)(1999); see H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, supra note 110, at 323, reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N., at 5103. "Under this definition, fiduciaries include officers and directors of a plan,
members of a plan's investment committee and persons who select these individuals." Id.; Robert
Eccles, Fiduciary Litigation under ERISA: 1975-1988, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 679, 682-83
(1988) (noting employer is fiduciary to extent of the power to appoint other plan fiduciaries).
114. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 402(c)(2) & (3), 29 U.S.C. §
1102(c)(2) & (3) (1999).
115. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-5 D-l(2001) (Department of Labor regulation for attorneys,
accountants, actuaries, and consultants). The courts generally follow the Department of Labor rule. See
Custer v. Sweeney, 89 F.3d 1156 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding attorney not a fiduciary); Hotel Employees
Union Welfare Fund v. Gentner, 50 F.3d 719 (9th Cir. 1995) (same); Pappas v. Buck Consultants, Inc.,
923 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1991) (ruling actuary not a fiduciary); Painters of Philadelphia District Council
No. 21 Welfare Fund v. Price Waterhouse, 879 F.2d 1146 (3d Cir. 1989) (holding auditor not a
fiduciary); see also Martin v. Feilen, 965 F.2d 660 (8th Cir. 1992) (noting accountants were fiduciaries,
as they had exercised discretion).
116. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 3(21)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. §
1002(2 1)(A)(ii) (1999). The Department of Labor has tried to ameliorate this status by requiring the
advice to be "on a regular basis" and pursuant to an agreement or understanding that "such services will
serve as a primary basis for investment decisions" by the plan. 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(c) (2001). These
regulations also provide that routine execution of orders by brokers does not render them a fiduciary. 29
C.F.R. § 2510.3-21(d) (2001). But since brokers also offer investment recommendations, courts split
over whether a particular broker has fiduciary status. Compare Olson v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 957
F.2d 622, 627 (8th Cir. 1992) (denying summary judgment motion that broker was not a fiduciary);
Farm King Supply Inc. Integrated Profit Sharing Plan and Trust v. Edward D. Jones & Co., 884 F.2d
288, 292 (7th Cir. 1989) (ruling not a fiduciary as lacks authority to dispose of the assets); with Thomas,
Head & Greisen Employees Trust v. Buster, 24 F.3d 1114, 1118 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that broker was
fiduciary due to a nine-year relationship); Wolin v. Smith Barney, Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 849 (7th Cir. 1996)
(noting fiduciary as had influence approaching control); see generally Howard Pianko & Stephen J.
Nelson, Special Issues Involving Broker-Dealers and Their Employee Benefit Plan Clients, 23 REAL
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 749 (1988).
117. ERISA allows persons to serve in more than one fiduciary capacity. Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 402(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1102(c)(1) (1999). As a result, many
plans have the named fiduciary and the plan administrator as the employer.
118. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 3(16), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)
(1999). The Department of Labor defines administrative discretion rendering one a fiduciary as
including the power to make or interpret plan policies and as excluding ministerial functions such as
processing claims, applying plan eligibility rules, communicating with employees, and calculating
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employer frequently serves as or controls the plan administrator, and is a

fiduciary in those capacities.11 9 One or more trustees are to hold the plan
assets.120 And the plan may subject these trustees to the control of a named
fiduciary who is not a trustee or an investment manager appointed by the named
12
fiduciary.' 2 1 ERISA specifically
deems investment managers as fiduciaries. 122
ERISA spells out four primary fiduciary duties. First is the exclusive
benefit rule, the ERISA version of the fiduciary duty of loyalty. Plan fiduciaries
"shall discharge [their] duties with respect to a plan solely in the interest of the

participants and beneficiaries and [for] the exclusive purpose [of] providing
benefits to participants and their beneficiaries ... ,,123 The ERISA exclusive

benefit rule expanded the pre-ERISA exclusive benefit rule to all fiduciary
duties, not just those of the trustees. 124 Two other ERISA provisions bolster the
duty of loyalty, necessitated by the fractionalization of fiduciaries and their
conflict of interest with the beneficiaries. The non-inurement rule prevents plan
assets from benefiting the employer. 125 The prohibited transaction rules forbid

benefits. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-8 D-2 (2001). Not all courts agree. Compare Healthsouth Rehab. Hosp.
v. Am. Nat'l Red Cross, 101 F.3d 1005 (4th Cir. 1996) (holding that limited role in claims processing
does not create a fiduciary); Witt v. Allstate Ins. Co., 50 F.3d 536 (8th Cir. 1995)(same); Kyle Rys. v.
Pac. Admin. Servs., Inc., 990 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1993) (same); Baker v. Big Star Div. of the Grand
Union Co., 893 F.2d 288 (1 1th Cir. 1990) (same); with Libbey-Owens-Ford Co. v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield Mut. of Ohio, 982 F.2d 1031, 1035 (6th Cir. 1993) (opining that authority to deny or grant claims
renders one a fiduciary).
119. If the plan names no administrator, ERISA deems the employer as the administrator.
Employee Retirement Income Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 3(16)(A)(ii), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(16)(A)(ii) (1999).
Consequently, the fiduciary sections can also apply to employers. See Barnes v. A.S. Lacy, D.C., 927
F.2d 539, 544 (1 1th Cir. 1991) (deciding that employers who act as plan administrator are fiduciaries to
the extent they function in their capacity as plan administrator); see also Law v. Ernst & Young, 956
F.2d 364 (1st Cir. 1992) (ruling that employers who act as plan administrator are fiduciaries to the extent
they function in their capacity as plan administrator even when the plan designates another as plan
administrator if the employer actively administers the plan); Rosen v. TRW, Inc., 979 F.2d 191 (1 1th
Cir. 1992) (same). Employers, however, are not plan fiduciaries for plan establishment, design,
amendment, or termination. See, e.g., Berger v. Edgewater Steel Co., 911 F.2d 911 (3d Cir. 1990)
(denying early retirement request); see also Jane Kheel Stanley, The Definition of a Fiduciary under
ERISA: Basic Principles, 27 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 237, 244-45 (1992) (describing the exception
to ERISA § 3(21), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(21) (1999), for the settlor functions of the Department of Labor and
business functions of the courts); see generally Frank P. VanderPloeg, Role-Playing under ERISA: The
Company as Employer' and Fiduciary',9 DEPAUL Bus. L.J. 259 (1997).
120. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 403(a), 29 U.S.C. §
1103(a)(1999).
121. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, §§ 402(c)(3), 403(a)(1) & (2), 29
U.S.C. §§ 1102(c)(3), 1103(a)(1) & (2) (1999).
122. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 3(38), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38)
(1999). Only certain entities can serve as investment managers, namely banks, insurance companies,
and investment advisors registered under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, Publ. L. No. 76-768, 54
Stat. 847 (1941) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-1 to 80b-21(1997)), and only if they
acknowledge it writing that they are a plan fiduciary. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, § 3(38), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(38)(c) (1999).
123. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 404(a)(1)(A)(I), 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (1999).
124. The Revenue Act of 1921 required the employer to establish a trust "for the exclusive benefit
of some or all of [the] employees." Revenue Act of 1921, ch. 136, § 219(f), 42 Stat. 227, 247 (1921);
see also 52 Stat. 447, 518 (1938) (Revenue Act of 1938) (same). The Labor Management Relations Act
of 1947 required contributions be made "for the sole and exclusive benefit of the employees ......
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, § 302(c)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 186(c)(5) (2000). Congress stated
that the exclusive benefit rule came from § 401 of the Internal Revenue Code. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 931280, supra note 110, at 302, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 5083.
125. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 403(c)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1) (1999)
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every sale, loan, or transfer of plan assets to a party-in-interest and self-dealing
by a fiduciary. 126 Congress modeled the prohibited transaction rules after
comparable rules designed to prevent insiders from abusing the assets of
charitable foundations. 27 These prohibitions are so sweeping, ERISA contains
an elaborate set of exemptions to rescue innocent transactions such as
compensation to service providers and paying benefits to one serving as a
fiduciary. 128
Second is the ERISA version of the prudent person rule. Plan fiduciaries
shall exercise "the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances
then prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with
such matters would use in the conduct of an enterprise of like character and with
like aims.'' 129 "Like capacity" and "enterprise of like character" suggests a
standard governed by the acts of prudent fiduciaries of ERISA plans, if not bank
trust departments and insurance company policy administrators. Moreover,
many plans use bank trust departments and insurance company administrators,
experts in their fields. So the standard is one of an expert in the field. 3 °
Unfortunately, courts have not reviewed fiduciary behavior under this standard,
but instead have limited its application to investments.131
Third is the ERISA version of the diversification rule. Plan fiduciaries shall
"diversifly] the investments of the plan so as to minimize the risk of large losses,
("[T]he assets of a plan shall never inure to the benefit of any employer and shall be held for the
exclusive [purpose] of providing benefits to participants in the plan and their beneficiaries ...").
126. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 406(a) & (b), 29 U.S.C. § 1106
(a) & (b) (1999).
127. See H.R. CONF. REP. No.93-1280, supra note 110, at 295, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., at
5076 (discussing rules against self-dealing that apply to private foundations); compare Pub. L. No. 91172, 83 U.S. Stat. 487, 499-502 (1969) (adding § 4941 to the Internal Revenue Code) with Employee
Retirement Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 406, 29 U.S.C. § 1106 (1999).
128. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, §§ 407, 408, 408(b)(2) &
408(b)(9), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1107 (indicating limitations for employer realty and stock held by the plan),
1108 (enumerating various innocent situations and Department of Labor authority to grant additional
exemptions), 1108(b)(2) (providing for arrangement with service contractors), & 1108(b)(9) (1999)
(fiduciary plan benefits).
129. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 404(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(B) (2000).
130. See Joseph R. Simone & Glenn E. Bulash, Fiduciary Responsibility and Prohibited
Transactions under ERISA, 502 PRACTICING L. INST,/TAx 675, 685 (2001) ("commonly referred to
as... the... 'prudent expert' rule" due to the "like capacity" and "like character" language). Most of
the cases deal with using the proper investigative procedures. See, e.g., In re Unisys Savings Plan
Litigation, 74 F.3d 420 (3d Cir. 1996); Zanditon v. Feinstein, 849 F.2d 692 (1st Cir. 1988); Fink v. Nat'l
Sav. & Trust Co., 772 F.2d 951 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Katsaros v. Cody, 744 F.2d 270 (2nd Cir.), cert. denied
469 U.S. 1072 (1984); Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d 1226 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied464 U.S. 1040
(1984).
131. See Wendy K. Mariner, Slouching Toward Managed Care Liability: Reflections on Doctrinal
Boundaries,ParadigmShifts, and Incremental Reform, 29 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 253, 263 (2001) (noting
problem of applying prudent person standard to acts other than asset management); Schwartz v.
Interfaith Med. Ctr., 715 F. Supp. 1190, 1195 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (noting the "prudent man standard of care
relates primarily to the management of plan assets"); see also George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: The
Arbitrary and Capricious Rule Under Siege, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 133, 135-36 (1989), see also
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) (using an abuse of discretion standard to
review plan administrator action, not the prudent person standard); DeBruyne v. Equitable Life
Assurance Soc., 920 F.2d 457, 465 (7th Cir. 1990) (using the prudent person standard for investments);
but see S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 97, at 31, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4867 ("[E]ven
with respect to the [otherwise prohibited] transactions expressly allowed, the fiduciary's conduct must be
consistent with the prudent man standards.").
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And

fourth, plan fiduciaries shall act "in accordance with the documents and
instruments governing the plan insofar as such documents and instruments are
consistent with [ERISA]. ' ' 33 So the trust 1documents
cannot countermand the
34
statutory duties of a fiduciary under ERISA.
Since ERISA provides for so many different fiduciaries, it also contains a
co-fiduciary liability provision. ERISA specifically provides for fiduciary
liability for the acts of another fiduciary when the fiduciary (1) knowingly
participates in or conceals the fiduciary breach, (2) enables the other fiduciary to
commit the breach, or (3) knows of the breach but fails to take corrective
action.1 35 Constructive knowledge will bring the duty into play. 136 Inaction
constitutes enablement.' 37 And some courts have imposed the duty to monitor
the co-fiduciary. 138 The obvious reason for the fractionalization of the
fiduciaries and imposing co-fiduciary liability is to insure sufficient policing to
detect defalcations.
139
Courts have described this co-fiduciary liability as joint and several.
Consequently, ERISA plaintiffs may bring an action against only some of the
fiduciaries, without bringing an action against all of them. 140 Due to the joint
and several liability under the co-liability provision, a co-fiduciary could easily
become liable for dastardly deeds done by another fiduciary. So the issue of
contribution and indemnification becomes of significant interest to fiduciaries.
Because of the co-fiduciary liability provision, ERISA expressly allows
trustees to allocate by agreement, if authorized by the plan, their responsibilities,
obligations and duties so as not to be liable for defalcations with respect to those
assets controlled by the other trustees, except as provided for in the three co-

132. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 404(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. §
1104(a)(1)(C) (2000).
133. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 404(a)(1)(D), 29 U.S.C. §
11 04(a)(1)(D) (2000).
134. See Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Cent. Transp., Inc., 472 U.S.
559, 568 (1985).
135. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)of 1974, § 405(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a)
(2000).
136. See Diduck v. Kaszycki & Sons Contractors, Inc., 974 F.2d 270, 283 (2d Cir. 1992).
137. See Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331, 1335 (7th Cir. 1984).
138. See Raffv. Belstock, 933 F. Supp. 909, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1996); Mazur v. Gaudet, 826 F. Supp.
188, 192 (E.D. La. 1992); Russo v. Unger, 1991 WL 254570, *5 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 1991); see also 29
CFR § i509.75-8 (2001) (Department of Labor regulation that appoints fiduciary duty to monitor).
139. See In re Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan and IRAP Litig., 957 F.2d 1020, 1027-28 (2d
Cir. 1992); Lowen v. Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209, 1221 (2d Cir. 1987); Donovan v.
Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1185 (7th Cir. 1985) (Coffe, J., concurring); Donovan v. Mazzola, 716 F.2d
1226, 1235 (9th Cir. 1983); District 65 Ret. Trust v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 1551 (N.D. Ga.
1996); Davidson v. Cook, 567 F. Supp. 225, 240 (E.D. Va. 1983), aff'd mem., 734 F.2d 10 (4th Cir.
1984); see also S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 97, at 46, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4882
("[Clo-fiduciaries are jointly and severally liable.").
140. See Struble v. N.J. Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 332 (3d Cir. 1984)
(unsued trustees were not indispensable parties for fiduciary duty action since multiple trustees may be
held jointly and severally liable); Jennings v. Pierce, 1995 WL 88795, *2-3 (N.D. Ill.) (same); see also
Donovan v. Tricario, 5 Employee Benefit Cas. 2057 (S.D. Fla. 1984) (defendant trustee liable to restore
all losses not previously restored to plan through settlement agreement with other defendants), affid sub.
nom. Brock v. Tricario, 768 F.2d 1351 (11 th Cir. 1985).
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fiduciary liability situations. 14' A similar rule allows the named fiduciaries to
split responsibilities and not be liable for other named fiduciary defalcations
except as provided for the three co-fiduciary liability situations. 142 The named
breaches in making the
fiduciaries, however, remain liable for fiduciary
43
it.1
continuing
or
it,
implementing
allocation,
ERISA makes fiduciaries who commit a breach of their fiduciary
responsibilities, obligations, or duties "personally liable to make good to [the]
plan any losses," as well as to restore any profits "made through use of assets of
the plan."' 144 These fiduciaries in such situations are also subject "to such other
equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropriate . . . 41
For the contribution and indemnity issue, the most important provisions are
the provisions concerning exculpation agreements and insurance. ERISA
section 410(a) voids all exculpatory agreements relieving fiduciaries from
liability as against public policy, except the agreements splitting up
responsibilities with respect to trustees and investment managers:
Except as provided in [the] section [relieving a trustee of responsibility
with respect to assets under the control of a co-trustee] and [insulating
trustee responsibility with respect to assets under the control of an
investment manager], any provision in an agreement or instrument which
purports to relieve a fiduciary from responsibility or liability for any
responsibility, 146obligation, or duty under this part shall be void as against
public policy.

The Department of Labor has interpreted this provision to mean that the plan
cannot agree to indemnify a plan fiduciary. 147 Legislative history indicates that
the reason for non-exculpation was that ERISA plans differ significantly from
testamentary trusts. Employee benefit plans have large numbers of participants
and enormous amounts of money.1 48 ERISA does contain one exculpation
provision for an individual account controlled by a participant, but only for
losses resulting from that participant's exercise of control. 149 Courts considering
ERISA section 410(a) have concluded that Congress intended to specify the
standard of conduct for ERISA fiduciaries and did not want fiduciaries to modify
that standard through exculpation or indemnity agreements. 150 These courts,
141. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 405(b)(1)(B) & (b)(2), 29
U.S.C. § 1105(b)(1)(B) & (b)(2) (1999).
142. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 405(c)(1) & (c)(2), 29 U.S.C. §
1104(c)(1) & (c)(2) (1999).
143. Id.
144. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)
(1999).
145. Id.
146. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 410(a), 29 U.S.C. §
11 10(a)(1999).
147. See 29 CFR § 2509.75-4 (2001).
148. S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 97, at 34, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4870.
149. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 404(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(c)
(1999).
150. See, e.g., Fujikawa v. Gushiken, 823 F.2d 1341, 1345 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 487 U.S.
1240 (1988); see also IT Corp. v. General American Life Ins. Co., 107 F.3d 1415, 1418 (9th Cir. 1997)
("a contract exonerating an ERISA fiduciary from fiduciary responsibilities is void as a matter of law"),
cert denied, 522 U.S. 1068 (1998); Kayes v. Pacific Lumber Co., 51 F.3d 1449, 1460 (9th Cir. 1995)
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however, have allowed indemnification of legal expenses of a fiduciary in the
successful defense of a fiduciary breach action by the plan.15 1 The theory for
these agreements to reimburse defense attorney's fees is that since no fiduciary
breach happened, no relieving of liability occurred, and hence no exculpation.
So except for limited situations ERISA does not even allow the practice common
15 2
in seventeenth century England of indemnifying sureties under an agreement.
ERISA also prohibits the plan from purchasing insurance protecting the
fiduciaries, unless the insurance provides that the insurer has recourse against the
fiduciary for the fiduciary's own breach:
Nothing in this subpart shall preclude a plan from purchasing insurance
for its fiduciaries or for itself to cover liability or losses occurring by
reason of the act or omission of a fiduciary, if such insurance permits
recourse by the insurer against the fiduciary
in the case of a breach of a
153
fiduciary obligation by such fiduciary.
Legislative history indicates that concern for the cost of the premiums without
the recourse ability prompted the provision. 154 That legislative history also
delineates the Congressional intent that the wrong-doing fiduciary not escape
liability. The Senate-passed bill only provided that the anti-exculpatory55
provision did not bar insurance subject to Department of Labor regulations.
The House-passed version did not have the insurance exception.' 56 The report
prepared for the use of the House and Senate conferees on the bill contained the
recommendations (1) to allow the plan to purchase the insurance for the
fiduciaries provided the insurer had "the right of subrogation against the persons
causing such loss", (2) that a fiduciary could purchase its own insurance, and (3)

("any interpretation of the Plan which prevents individuals acting in a fiduciary capacity from being
found liable as fiduciaries is void"); Martin v. Nationsbank, 1993 WL 345606 (N.D. Ga.) (refusing to
enforce provision of trust agreement which provided complete indemnification of trustee that followed
precisely the participant's direction provisions of the plan document).
151. See, e.g., Packer Engineering, Inc. v. Kratville, 965 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1992); see also
Spickerman v. Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund, 801 F.2d 257, 261
& n.3 (7th Cir. 1986); Martin v. Walton, 773 F. Supp. 1524, 1527 (S.D. Fla. 1991) (requiring indemnity
of legal expenses to fiduciary for alleged breach of fiduciary duty is not a reasonable expense of plan
administration); but see Moore v. Williams, 902 F. Supp. 957, 966-67 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (can advance
expenses by fund until liability determined). This merely follows the pre-ERISA practice for plans
subject to the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (LMRDA) of 1959, 29 U.S.C. § 401(a)
(1998), which also had a specific provision voiding exculpatory provisions. See 29 U.S.C. § 501 (1998);
Morrissey v. Segal, 526 F.2d 121, 126 (2d Cir. 1975) (rule from traditional trust law, trustee can not
obtain indemnification if due to his own fault, citing Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 245); McNamara
v. Johnston, 522 F.2d 1157, 1167 (7th Cir. 1975) (allow repayment of legal fees only if defendants
prevail); Holdeman v. Sheldon, 311 F.2d 2, 3 (2d Cir. 1962) (union can reimburse if successful or based
on reasonable judgment); see also Leigh v. Engle, 619 F. Supp. 154 (N.D. I11.1985) (policy of LMRDA
and ERISA same on legal fee indemnity).
152. But see infra note 166 and accompanying text for another exception authorized by the
Department of Labor.
153. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 410(b)(1), 29 U.S.C. §
11 10(b)(1) (2000).
154. See Jeffrey R. Fuller, Fidelity Liability Insurance, 35 Annual N.Y.U. Inst. on Fed. Tax ERISA Suppl. 31, 37 (1977) (to save exorbitant premiums).
155. See SENATE SUBCOMM. ON LABOR OF THE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE,
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 1974: PUBLIC LAW

93-4063, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976), [hereinafter Legislative History].
156. Seeid. at3955.
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an employer could purchase insurance for its employees serving as fiduciaries.'
So plan-purchased insurance would only have value to the innocent fiduciary.' 5

57

But there is a more potent reason for the recourse provision. It increases the
liability of a co-fiduciary. The ERISA provision permitting the plan to purchase
insurance with recourse abrogates the common law rule against subrogation
against a co-insured when the policy covers both, as is typical with ERISA
fiduciary liability policies.1 59 Insurance law allows an implied subrogation
action in certain situations when the insurer pays the insured, especially when it
will prevent a feasor from escaping liability. 160 But this right of subrogation

does not extend to an insurer suing its own insured, in order to prevent the
insuror's recovery of the payment to the insured.' 6' This anti-subrogation rule
also applies to additional insureds even if their negligence caused the loss. 16 2 So
under insurance law an insurer paying a judgment or settlement on behalf of one
of several jointly and severally liable and insured co-trustees could not sue by
subrogation the additional insured, but responsible co-trustee. 163 This insurance
law anti-subrogation rule might otherwise apply to ERISA plans since the
64
ERISA preemption provision contains an exception for state insurance law.
The effect of the ERISA provision is to eliminate this state common law rule and
allow the insurer to proceed against the fiduciary committing the breach, thus
increasing the liability of that ERISA fiduciary.
ERISA, however, does permit the fiduciaries to purchase insurance on their
65
own behalf, and the employer to purchase insurance to protect the fiduciaries.
The above subrogation rule should provide a strong incentive for a fiduciary to
purchase insurance without the recourse provision. The Department of Labor
has interpreted this non-plan-purchased insurance provision as authorizing
indemnification agreements in the same manner that other parties may purchase
insurance for fiduciaries.' 66 So ERISA authorizes indemnification of fiduciaries

157. See id. at 5261 ("Summary of Differences Between the Senate Version and the House Version
of H.R. 2 to Provide for Pension Reform").
158. See Fuller, supra note 154, at 37 (noting just very little protection against liability for errors
and omissions); see also, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supranote 155, at 5261 (recommendation to conferees
on the bill to allow the plan to purchase the insurance for the fiduciaries provided the insurer had "the
right of subrogation against the persons causing such loss").
159. See infra notes 171-77 and accompanying text for typical ERISA fiduciary liability insurance
policy provisions.
160. See Robert Keeton, Insurance Law: A Gudie to FundamentalPrinciples,Legal Doctrines, and
CommercialPractices 222 (West Publ. Co., 4th ed. 1988).
161. See id. at 221; John A. Selzer, Note, Extension of the No SubrogationAgainst Insured Rule, 56
NEB. L. REV. 765, 773 (1977).
162. See Bruce B. Zager, Note, Conflicts Regarding the No Subrogation Against Insured' Rule, 29
DRAKE L. REV. 811, 817 (1980) (generally subcontractors of the general contractor).
163. But see id. at 813 (minor trend away from anti-subrogation rule for builders' risk contracts).
164. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 514(b)(2)(A), 29 U.S.C. §
1134(b)(2)(A) (1999).
165. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 410(b)(2) & (3), 29 U.S.C. §
11 0(b)(2) & (3) (1999). The purpose of this structure is not to relieve the plan of the cost of insuring
itself. Plans can pay reasonable service provider fees to fiduciaries. Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 408(b)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 11 10(b)(2) (1999). Reasonable fiduciary fees,
meshed in with the fiduciary's overhead, would cover the fiduciary's costs, including insurance
premiums. Id.
166. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4 (2001) (indemnification in the same manner as purchase of
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by employers.1 67 Legislative history indicates that the function of the ability for
fiduciaries to purchase insurance, even without recourse, or having the employer
purchase
it for them, was to alleviate the harshness of the non-exculpation
68
1
rule.
169
ERISA also requires bonding to protect the plan from fiduciary theft.
These provisions have left the impression among some that Congress desired
professional fiduciaries for ERISA plans, not laymen as is often the case for
70
testamentary trusts.
As a result of these ERISA insurance provisions, insurance companies have
developed three types of insurance for plans: (1) the fidelity bond, (2) employee
benefit liability that covers administrative matters only, and (3) fiduciary liability
that provides fuller coverage. 171 These policies generally cover all the
fiduciaries and the plan. 72 They pay on claims made during the coverage
period. 173 Since plans generally pay for these policies, the latter two types of
policies have the recourse provision. But a fiduciary or the employer can
purchase of a waiver of recourse. 174 The cost of these waivers, contrary to
Congressional expectation, 175 usually is nominal. 176 The fiduciary liability
policy usually has exclusions for (1) administrative expenses (eliminating
lawsuits that allege the fiduciary paid too much for services), (2) for investment
decisions made by others than a qualified professional asset manager (identified
by the Department of Labor and typically a bank or large investment house), (3)
co-trustee liability (to avoid the politics of a lawsuit brought by one fiduciary
against another), and (4) for former fiduciaries. 177 Since the policies are claimsbased, the latter exclusion is significant to a retiring or removed fiduciary. The
appearance of insurance provisions in ERISA exhibits a Congressional effort to
ameliorate the harsh aspects of the fiduciary rules.
Jurisdiction for the contribution and indemnity actions under ERISA lies

insurance).
167. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.75-4 (2001) (providing indemnification examples of fiduciary by
employer and employee of fiduciary by fiduciary); see also Dardaganis v. Grace Capital, Inc., 889 F.2d
1237, 1243 (2d Cir. 1989) (dicta following the Department of Labor regulation for employee of
fiduciary); Donovan v. Cunningham, 541 F. Supp. 276, 279 n.1 (S.D. Tex 1982) (indemnification by
employer in plan provision). The court rejected indemnification by employer of employee since the
plan owned stock in the employer. Id. at 289, rev'd in part on other grounds, 716 F.2d 1455 (5th Cir.

1983).
168. H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 93-1280, at 320-21 (1974), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5038, 5101.
169. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 412, 29 U.S.C. § 1112 (1999).
170. See Geoffrey V. White, Prudent Delegation of Trustees' Responsibilities to Professionals,29
LAB. L.J. 586, 587 (1978) (prudent person rule designed to keep amateurs out as fiduciaries of pension
trusts).
171. See generally John L. Bayley, A GeneralOverview ofFiduciaryLiability Insurance Coverage,
ELC GLASS CLE 619 (1998).
172. See Sandy Codding, Analyzing the Fiduciary Liability Policy, 339 PRACTICING LAW
INSTITtuTE/TAx 79, 84 (1993).
173. Seeid at 81.
174. See id.
175. See supra note 154 and accompanying text.
176. See Fuller, supra note 154, at 37 (slight difference between the two).
177. See generally Bayley, supranote 171.
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with the federal courts. 178 Consequently, the claim for contribution or indemnity
almost always arises under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for
counterclaims, if the co-fiduciary is179already a party, and third-party claims, if the
co-fiduciary is not already a party.
B. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN ERISA TRUST LAW AND TRADITIONAL TRUST LAW
Traditional trust law does recognize contribution and indemnification for a
jointly and severally liable fiduciary.' 80 But traditional trust law also differs
significantly from ERISA fiduciary law in several respects.' 81 Employee benefit
plans have large numbers of participants and involve enormous amounts of
money.' 82 ERISA fiduciaries frequently have interests adverse to those of the
beneficiaries. 183 Consequently, Congress designed ERISA fiduciary law at
variance from traditional trust law in several respects.
First, under traditional trust law the definition of the entity with the
fiduciary responsibilities is much narrower. The fiduciary under traditional trust
law is the entity holding title to the property, 184 not the entity with discretion
over management, assets, or administration. Consequently, traditional trust law
does not envision the fractionalization of fiduciaries present for an ERISA plan.
Traditional trust law provides for a single trustee, whether an individual or a
corporate fiduciary such as a bank trust department, or a set of co-trustees as the
fiduciaries. 85 But where there are co-trustees, they perform the trusteeship
functions jointly, acting with unanimity unless the settlor provides otherwise by
the terms of the trust. 18 6 Moreover, because of traditional trust law's narrow
definition of fiduciary, that law extends fiduciary liability to non-fiduciaries.' 87
ERISA has no need for this rule since many of these non-fiduciaries
participating in a fiduciary breach are themselves deemed fiduciaries under
88
ERISA.'

178. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 502 (e), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(e)
(1999).
179. FED. R. CIV. P. 13 & 14.
180. See supra notes 32-36 and accompanying text.
181. This article does not intend to provide a complete discussion of the differences between
ERISA's fiduciary rules and those of traditional trust law. It merely attempts to indicate that there are
differences and focuses on those differences that should have a bearing on the issue of whether ERISA
allows contribution and indemnity.
182. See S. REP. NO. 93-127, supra note 97, at 34, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 4869-70.
183. Pegram v. Herdich, 530 U.S. 211, 225 (2000).
184. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 2 (1959). "A trust... is a fiduciary relationship with
respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title to the property is held to equitable
duties ....
Id.
185. Seeid.
186. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, §§ 184 & 194 (1959). "If there are several trustees,
each trustee is under a duty to the beneficiar[ies] to participate in the administration of the trust and to
use reasonable care to prevent a co-trustee from committing a breach of trust, [and if necessary] to
compel a co-trustee to redress a breach of trust." Id. § 184. "If there are two or more trustees, the
powers conferred upon them can properly be exercised only by all the trustees, unless it is otherwise
provided by the terms of the trust." Id. § 194.
187. See Smith v. Ayer, 101 U.S. 320, 325 (1879); BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 17, § 90, at 304;
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 281-295, 321-326 (1959).
188. See Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270 (3d Cir. 1995); Reich v. Continental Casualty Co., 33 F.3d
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Secondly, traditional trust law requires a fiduciary duty to treat multiple
beneficiaries impartially. 189 ERISA plans have far more beneficiaries that do
traditional trusts and so the potential for conflicting interests among beneficiaries
is endemic. So ERISA contains no pronouncement of this fiduciary duty. Some
courts, never the less, have operated
under the assumption the exclusive benefit
90
rule includes the impartiality duty.'
Thirdly, traditional trust law's co-fiduciary liability encompasses more than
the three situations enumerated in ERISA. Under traditional trust law,
participation and concealing is not limited by knowledge, concealing includes
acquiescence and approval, and improper delegation to a co-trustee is an
additional ground.' 9'
Fourthly, the prudent person standard of traditional trust law is less
strenuous than that of ERISA. Traditional trust law calls for the prudence a
person would use for his own property. 92 ERISA's standard is that of an expert,
namely one acting in like capacity, familiar with the transaction, and conducting
an enterprise of like character. 193 As a result ERISA fiduciaries try to insulate
themselves with paid expert witnesses at trial. 194 ERISA also allows
adherence
96
195
to modem portfolio theory, while traditional trust law does not.1
Fifthly, the co-trustee liability provision for traditional trust law is more
strenuous than that of ERISA. Traditional trust law requires the co-trustee to use
reasonable care to prevent the co-trustee's breach, and compel the co-trustee to
redress the breach.' 97 ERISA, due to its fractionalization of fiduciaries, allows
delegation of duties and insulation from liability.' 98 So the requirement is to take

reasonable steps to remedy the breach, if and when the co-fiduciary has

754 (7th Cir. 1994); Reich v. Rowe, 20 F.3d 25, 32 (1st Cir. 1994) ("Congress decided that the best
approach was to limit liability for non-fiduciaries, especially service providers, while at the same time
increasing the number of fiduciary parties and the scope of fiduciary responsibility."); see also Mertens
v. Hewitt Assoc., 508 U.S. 248 (1993) (holding there is no damage action against non-fiduciaries,
leaving open equitable relief against non-fiduciaries).
189. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § § 183 ("When there are two or more beneficiaries
of a trust, the trustee is under a duty to deal impartially with them.") & 232 ("If a trust is created for
beneficiaries in succession, the trustee is under a duty to the successive beneficiaries to act with due
regard to their respective interests.").
190. See Oster v. Barco of California Employees' Retirement Plan, 869 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir.
1988); Struble v. New Jersey Brewery Employees' Welfare Trust Fund, 732 F.2d 325, 333 (3d Cir.
1984); Morse v, Stanley, 732 F.2d 1139, 1145 (2d Cir. 1984).
191. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 224(2) with Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 405(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1105(a) (1999).
192. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 174.
193. See supra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
194. See In re Unysis Savings Plan Litigation, 173 F.3d 145, 156-57 (3d Cir. 1999) (rejecting an
expert with less than stellar credentials); Howard v. Shay, 100 F.3d 1484, 1489-90 (9th Cir. 1996)
(noting that an independent appraisal does not insulate a fiduciary).
195. See 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (2001) (outlining the Department of Labor regulation on
investment duties); Laborers Nat'l Pension Fund v. Northern Trust Quantitative Advisors, Inc., 173 F.3d
313, 322 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting that modem portfolio managers allowed to use modem portfolio theory
since 1979).
196. Traditional trust law judges riskiness of each investment in isolation from the others. See
Leslie Joyner Bobo, Comment, Nontraditonal Investments of Fiduciaries: Re-Examining the Prudent
Investor Rule, 33 EMORY L.J. 1067, 1077-78 (1984).
197. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 184.
198. See supra notes 141-43 and accompanying text.
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knowledge of the breach, not to enable, and not to participate in the breach.' 99
Seventhly, traditional trust law permits the trust documents to void any trust
law rule,2 °° contrary to ERISA's hierarchy placing the statute over the
documents. Traditional trust law allows the trust documents to relieve trustees
from fiduciary liability, 20 1 contrary to ERISA's non-exculpation scheme to
insure plan recovery for defalcations by fiduciaries. Traditional trust law allows
trustee liability insurance purchased by the trustee, as does ERISA. But
traditional trust law does not allow the trust to purchase insurance for the trustee
for trustee defalcations since the trust receives no benefit.20 2 ERISA allows this
latter insurance, if accompanied by recourse.20 3
So in interpreting ERISA's statutory provisions, the interpreter must bear in
mind the both differing trust structure of an ERISA plan and the differing
fiduciary law of ERISA from that of the traditional trust and its law. Similarly, a
court can not just import a traditional trust law rule into the ERISA context
without first insuring that such a rule comports with the remainder of ERISA's
trust law.
C. ERISA LEGISLATIVE HISTORY CONCERNING THE FIDUCIARY PROVISIONS
The legislative history of ERISA bears out this scenario of raising the
behavioral level of plan officials to that of a fiduciary along with the admonition
to note the differences with traditional trust law.
Early efforts at pension reform revealed a substantial split between labor
groups and business groups. In the 1950's Congressional hearings revealed
abuses such as looting, corrupt administration, outrageous administrative and
investment costs, and excessive investments in employer securities.2 0 4 Since
most abuses related to multi-employer plans controlled by labor groups, business
groups opposed extension of the reform to private plans.20 5 So only a much
weakened disclosure act, the Welfare and Pension Plans Disclosure Act of 1958
(WPPDA), with no enforcement authority in any federal agency passed.20 6 In
the early 1960's a private report spawned a Presidential committee to respond to
public outcries of the ineffectiveness of the WPPDA and the collapse of the

199. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
200. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 164 (noting that instrument specifies the trustee's
duties, and traditional trust law applies only when the instrument is silent); SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra
note 17, § 164, at 250; BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 17, §§ 42, at 432-433 & 541, at 161-62.
201. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 222 (1959) (noting that the trustee, by provisions
in the trust, can be relieved of liability for breach of trust.). The two exceptions to this rule are for bad
faith, intentional, or reckless behavior of the fiduciary and for abuse of a confidential relationship with
the settlor. Id
202. See BOGERT & BOGERT, supra note 17, § 599, at 500 (without support: as no advantage to the
trust); see also SCOTT & FRATCHER, supra note 17, § 246-47, at 345-50 (trustee not entitled to
reimbursement for contract or tort when no benefit is conferred on the trust).
203. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
204. Michael Gordon, Overview: Why Was ERISA Enacted?, U.S. Senate, Special Comm. On
Aging, The Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974: The FirstDecade 6 (1984).

205.

Id. at 7.

206.

Id at 6.
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Studebaker plan.2 °7 But the Presidential committee specifically recommended
against the imposition of any federal fiduciary standards.0 8
In the mid-1960's, however, Senate hearings concerning the ineffectiveness
of the WPPDA to deter abuse for multi-employer plans prompted Republican
Senator Jacob K. Javits, a member of the committee conducting the hearings, to
introduce a bill to amend the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (LMRA)
by imposing fiduciary standards on multi-employer plans with the right to
enforce lying both with the participants and the Department of Labor. 20 9 The
Democratic Administration countered with a bill, also imposing fiduciary
standards, to amend the WPPDA so that the fiduciary standards would also apply
to private plans.21 ° Javits introduced a more comprehensive bill in 1967 drafted
by experienced labor lawyers serving the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare. 21 Thereafter, the battle over the drafting and contents of ERISA was
between the Senate Labor Subcommittee and the Administration. 22112 In 1972,
Democrat Senator Harrison Williams and Javits introduced a joint bill that
replaced the original Javits proposal, retaining its structure and approach but
with the Department of Labor supervision to gain Labor's support to offset an
obvious business opposition to the substantive parts of the bill. 2 13 Williams
served on the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare, the other cosponsor of the bill, and the floor manager of the bill. 21 4 The business groups

preferred the Administration's bill. 2 15 Legislative maneuvering allowed the
Senate Committee on Finance to gut the reforms, recommended unanimously by
the Senate Labor and Welfare Committee, as affecting tax jurisdiction. 216 Public
outcry, spawned by an impassioned speech by Javits, led to the staffs of the
Senate Committees on Labor and Public Welfare and Finance to prepare a joint
labor-tax bill embodying the Williams-Javits reforms, that ultimately passed.217
Since ERISA involved tax provisions, two committees in each house
considered the matter, one for the labor provisions and one for the tax
provisions. The fiduciary provisions, appearing in the labor portions of ERISA,
came before the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare and the House
Committee on Education and Labor. Since the motivating force behind the bill

207. Id. at 8-9.
208. Id. at 9.
209. Id. at 11; see also Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 156 (1985)
(recognizing Javits as co-sponsor of the legislation). See supra note 213 and accompanying text (noting
that although Javits became co-sponsor of ERISA, he was originally the sole sponsor of the legislation).
By the time of the passage of ERISA, Javits was the ranking Republican on the Senate Committee on
Labor and Public Welfare. 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. XCII (showing Javits membership on the committee).
210. Gordon, supra note 204, at 11.
211. Id. at 12.
212. Id. at 14, 18.
213. Id. at 20.
214. See 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. XCII; Theodore Paul Manno, ERISA Preemption and the McCarranFerguson Act: The Need for Congressional Action, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 51, 61 (1979); Leon E. Irish &
Harrison J. Cohen, ERISA Preemption: Judicial Flexibility and Statutory Rigidity, 19 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 109, 113 (1985).
215. Gordon, supra note 204, at 20.
216. Id at 23.
217. Id. at 23-24.
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were Senators Javits and Harrison, the report of their committee is essentially the
voice of the draftsmen. As a result the report of the corresponding House
committee merely parroted the Senate report, even where the House bill differed
in language. 2 18 The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare prepared by the draftsmen of the legislation made it clear that these
draftsmen lifted the fiduciary standards from traditional trust law.
The fiduciary responsibility section, in essence, codifies and makes
applicable to these fiduciaries certain principles developed in the
evolution of the law of trusts.
[The act] incorporate[s] the core principles of fiduciary conduct as
adopted from existing trust law, but with modifications appropriate for
employee benefit plans. These salient principles place a twofold duty on
every fiduciary: to act in his relationship to the plan's fund as a prudent
man in a similar situation and under like conditions would act, and to act
consistently with the principles of administering the trust for the exclusive
purposes previously enumerated .... 219
These draftsmen did not blindly follow traditional trust law. They made those
modifications they felt necessary to apply traditional trust law to employee
benefit plans, specifically mentioning three characteristics of traditional trust law
they wanted changed: (1) They desired the fiduciary standards to apply even if
the funding mechanism was not in trust form, (2) they wanted the fiduciary
standards to apply even if the settlor, the employer for many employee benefit
plans, specified contrary rules, mentioning specifically the exculpation clause,
and (3) they wanted uniform national rules.
The section was deemed necessary for several reasons:
First, a number of plans are structured in such a way that it is unclear
whether the traditional law of trusts is applicable ....

Second, even

where the funding mechanism of the plan is in the form of a trust, reliance
on conventional trust law often is insufficient to adequately protect the
interests of plan participants and beneficiaries. This is because trust law
had developed in the context of testamentary and inter vivos trusts
(usually designed to pass designated property to an individual or small
group of persons) with an attendant emphasis on carrying out the
instructions of the settlor. Thus, if the settlor includes in the trust
document an exculpatory clause under which the trustee is relievedfrom
liabilityfor certain actions which would otherwise constitute a breach of
duty, or if the settlor specifies that the trustee shall be allowed to make
investments which might otherwise be considered imprudent, the trust law
in many states will be interpretedto allow the deviation. In the absence of
a fiduciary responsibility section in the present Act, courts applying trust
law to employee benefit plans have allowed the same kinds of deviations,
even though the typical employee benefit plan, covering hundreds or even

218. See George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: ExtracontractualDamages Mandatedfor Benefit Claims
Actions, 36 ARIZ. L. REV. 611, 643-47 (1994) (discussing the deletion myth for the absence of legal
remedies based on the differences in the two bills, yet the two reports say the same thing).
219. S. REP. NO. 93-127, at 29-30 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4865-66.
Compare with H.R. REP. No. 533, at 12-13 (1973), reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4639, 4650-51.
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thousands of participants, is quite different from the testamentary trust
both in purpose and in nature. Third,... a fiduciary standard embodied
in Federal legislation is considered desirable because it will bring a
measure of uniformity in an area where decisions under the same set of
facts may differ from state to state. It is expected that courts will interpret
the prudent man rule and other fiduciary standards bearing in mind the
special nature and purposes of employee benefit plans intended to be
effectuated by the Act ....
There follows a list of proscriptions [the prohibited transactions] which
represents the most serious type of fiduciary misconduct which in one
way or another has occurred in connection with some welfare or pension
plans .... 22
Consequently, Congress specifically expressed its distaste for agreements that
relieved fiduciaries from their liabilities that state courts then enforced under
traditional trust law.
The report of the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare as the
report of the draftsmen, but not the parroted version of the House Committee on
Education and Labor, went on to elaborate on a few of these modified trust law
principles: (1) the prudent person standard should apply to all the fiduciary
duties, not just investment, (2) the personal liability provisions were codified
from the traditional law of trusts, and (3) fiduciaries could limit their liability by
allocating duties amongst themselves.
It is emphasized, however, that even with respect to the transactions
expressly allowed, the fiduciary's conduct must be consistent with the
prudent man standards ....
Thus [by the codification of traditional trust law] a fiduciary is made
personally liable for his breach of any responsibility, duty, or obligation
owed to the fund, and must reimburse the fund for any loss resulting from
such a breach. He must also pay over to the fund any personal profit
realized through use of fund assets ....
In this connection [referring to the ban on exculpatory provisions], it
should be noted that while co-fiduciaries are permitted to allocate
responsibilities among themselves and, by so doing, generally limit their
liability to the extent of their specified duties, a co-fiduciary who has
specific knowledge of a breach of trust committed by a co-fiduciary or
who could have reasonably been expected to realize that another cofiduciary was breaching his trust, can be held personally liable for failure
to compel redress of the breach or prevent the breach ... any fiduciary
who breaches his trust is personally liable for losses resultinhtfrom such
breach, and co-fiduciaries are jointly and severally liable ....
After each house passed their bills, the conference committee, composed of
those legislators most knowledgeable about the legislation, reported. Statements

220. S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 97, at 29-30, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., 4838, 4865-66
(emphasis added); H.R. REP. No. 93-533, supra note 97, at 12-13, reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.,
4639, 4649-51.
221. S. REP. No. 93-127, supra note 97, at 31, 33, 34, 46-47, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., 4838,
4867, 4869, 4870, 4882.
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by the sponsors of the bill, the spokesmen for the draftsmen, made introducing
the Conference Committee's report again indicated the traditional trust law
source.
"The objectives of these [fiduciary] provisions are to make applicable the
law of trusts.
,222 The Conference Committee's report added information
concerning the remedies available: (1) they were similar to those of traditional
trust law, (2) a court could impose other appropriate relief, and (3) liability
existed only while serving as a fiduciary.
The labor law provisions apply rules and remedies similar to those under
traditional trust law to govern the conduct of fiduciaries ....
Under the labor provisions (but not the tax provisions) of the substitute, a
fiduciary who breaches the fiduciary requirements of the bill is to be
personally liable for any losses to the plan resulting from this breach.
Such a fiduciary is also to be liable for restoring to the plan any profits
which he has made through the use of any plan asset. In addition, such a
fiduciary is to be subject to other appropriate relief (including removal) as
ordered by a court ....
Generally, a plan fiduciary is not to be liable for any breach of fiduciary
duty if it occurred
before he became a fiduciary or after he was no longer
22 3
a fiduciary.

The conference report contained a long passage concerning co-fiduciary liability,
including an admonition concerning the remedy.
The proper remedy is to be determined by the facts and circumstances of
the particular case, and it may be affected by the relationship of the
fiduciary to the plan and to the co-fiduciary, the duties and responsibilities
of the fiduciary in question, and the nature of the breach.224
The conference report directed the courts to consider the purposes of ERISA
when interpreting the fiduciary standards.
The conferees expect that the courts will interpret this prudent man rule
(and the other fiduciary standards) bearing in mind the special nature and
purpose of employee benefit plans.225
D. THE PURPOSES

OF THE

ERISA FIDUCIARY PROVISIONS

There are two purposes that courts need to bear in mind when interpreting
the ERISA fiduciary provisions. 226
The fr
first deals with protecting the
expectations of participants, the second, with fostering plan growth. The typical
interplay is that participant expectations are protected by the higher behavioral
standards contained in the labor portions of ERISA and plan growth is fostered
by the tax subsidy contained in the tax sections of ERISA.

222. 120 CONG. REC. S29,932 (daily ed. Aug. 22, 1974) (statement of Sen. Williams), reprinted in
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 5186.
223. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 93-1280, supra note 110, at 295, 320 (1974), reprinted in 1974
U.S.C.C.A.N., 5076, 5100.
224. Id.at 300, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 5080.
225. Id.at 302, reprintedin 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N., at 5083.
226. See George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan
Interpretation,32 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 955, 978-94 (1995).
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But the efficacy of any tax subsidy depends on that subsidy exceeding the
added cost of the compliance with the higher standards. So the test for any
interpretation of the fiduciary sections of ERISA, including whether contribution
and indemnity is included, is both to make sure the court rule protects the
interests of participant, and also does not seriously adversely affect the costs of
plan operation.22 7
To provide the appearance of independence some employers need to hire
professional fiduciaries, such as bank trust departments or insurance company
administrators. These entities are not likely to serve as fiduciaries unless they
receive adequate compensation for exposing themselves to fiduciary liability,
especially for the defalcations of other fiduciaries. To limit that liability, they
negotiate for limited duties in the trust or administrative documents. Since
ERISA prevents exculpation provisions or insurance paid for by the plan, these
entities negotiate for employer paid insurance or raise their fees to cover such an
added expense. In either case the cost of such insurance will be born by the plan,
either through reduced employer contributions when the employer obtains the
insurance or pays the fiduciary's fee or by paying the fiduciary fee. So the issue
of whether these entities have the right to contribution and indemnity becomes
important. They might not serve as fiduciaries 228 or at such a higher cost that
might discourage the employer from adopting the plan or scaling it down.
III. POSITIONS OF THE COURTS AND COMMENTATORS
The Supreme Court has spelled out two approaches for determining
whether a preemptive federal statute encompasses a certain remedy. Under the
statutory construction method, the Supreme Court has mandated that the court
examine four relevant factors: (1) the language of the statute, (2) the legislative
history for the statute, (3) the underlying statutory scheme, and (4) the
Congressional intent to supersede state law. 229 For ERISA the relevant statutory
remedies provision, section 502(a), permits plan fiduciaries to bring civil actions
in three situations: (1) for "appropriate relief' for breach of fiduciary duty, (2) to
enjoin violations of the plan or ERISA, and (3) to obtain "other appropriate
equitable relief' to redress such violations or enforce provisions of the plan or
227. See Varity v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 538 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting the importance
of reducing employer costs so as not to discourage the growth of private pension plans); Massachusetts
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134, 148 n.17 (1985) (same); Larocca v. Borden, Inc., 276 F.3d
22, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) (same); see also Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633, 658
(1990) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (PBGC should favor alternatives that increase a company's use and
maintenance of private pension plans); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 446 U.S. 359,
379-80 n.30 (1980) (expressing concern that right to go against employer assets not be so great as to
discourage growth of private pension plans); id.at 385 n.35 (noting that banning employer liability
disclaimer clauses would be inconsistent with Congress' intent to encourage maintenance of private
pension plans); Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 4002(a)(1), 29 U.S.C.
§1302(a)(1) (2000) (PBGC created "to encourage the continuation and maintenance of voluntary private
pension plans for the benefit of their participants.").
228. See NARDA, Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 744 F.Supp. 685, 698 (D. Md.
1990) (absence of contribution or indemnity "would inhibit otherwise willing persons from agreeing to
act" as fiduciaries for fear of becoming liable for acts of those over which they have no control without
any possible legal recourse).
229. See Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transp. Workers Union of Am., 451 U.S. 77, 91 (1981).
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ERISA. 230 So this approach would attempt to find that one of these actions
encompasses contribution and indemnity.
Under the other method, federal common law implication, the Supreme
Court has mandated the court examine a very similar set of four relevant factors:
(1) whether the plaintiff belongs to the class for whose benefit Congress enacted
the statute, (2) whether the legislative history shows an intent to create or deny
the remedy, (3) whether the remedy comports with the legislative scheme, and
(4) whether Congress traditionally relegates the
subject matter to the states
23
making implication of the remedy inappropriate. '
Three Circuit Courts have investigated whether ERISA permits contribution
and indemnity. The earliest circuit, the Seventh Circuit, used the statutory
construction method and found contribution and indemnity in the first action, as
"appropriate relief' for breach of fiduciary duty. But the other federal courts
have not followed the Seventh Circuit since the Supreme Court erroneously
concluded that the language "appropriate relief' for the first action limits
recovery to the plan, not a beneficiary2 32 much less a fiduciary.
The latter two Circuit Courts, the Ninth and the Second Circuits, however,
have failed to examine whether any of the other statutorily authorized actions
permit contribution and indemnity. Instead, these Circuit Courts have boldly
concluded that ERISA does not explicitly provide for contribution and indemnity
due to the absence of the words "contribution and indemnity".23 3 As a result of
the assumption that ERISA contains no contribution and indemnity remedy,
these Circuit Courts have focused on the implication method. Those courts
focusing on the first factor, namely the class Congress intended to benefit, have
concluded that ERISA bars contribution and indemnity. Those courts focusing
on the second factor, namely the legislative history, have concluded that ERISA
permits contribution and indemnity.
Neither have examined whether
contribution and indemnity comports with ERISA's liability and remedial
schemes.
A. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY ALLOWED AS A REMEDY FOR FIDUCIARY
BREACH

The Seventh Circuit found that "appropriate relief' for fiduciary breach

230. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 502(a)(2), (3), 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a) (1999) ("A civil action may be brought... (2) by... a fiduciary for appropriate relief under
section 1109 [for breach of fiduciary duty], (3) by a... fiduciary (A) to enjoin any act or practice which
violates any provision of this subchapter or the terms of the plan, or (B) to obtain other appropriate
equitable relief (i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any provisions of this subchapter or the
terms of the plan ....).
231. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975).
232. See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985); Employee Retirement
Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1999); see also infra note 242 for
an explanation of the Supreme Court's misconstruction of the provision.
233. See Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Maryland, 939 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1991); cert.
denied 505 U.S. 1212 (1992); see also Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9th Cir. 1989) (searching
only the discredited "equitable remedies" of ERISA, § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. §1109(a) (1999), for the
remedy).
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included contribution and indemnity. 234 Since the inactive trustee seeking
contribution and indemnity conceded that the court should not seek contribution
and indemnity under the federal common law, the Seventh Circuit focused on the
statutory construction method. 35 So the Seventh Circuit sought consistency
between the remedy of contribution and indemnity and the four factors for
statutory construction: (1) the language of the statute, (2) the legislative history
of the statute, and (4) Congressional
of the statute, (3) the purposes and structure
236
intent to supersede state law remedies.
The court found the requisite statutory language for apportioning damages
equitably among wrongdoers in "appropriate relief' for breach of fiduciary
duty.237 But the issue for finding contribution and indemnity in a preemptive
federal statute is not whether such remedy could lie in certain language, but
whether Congress designed the statutory language to compensate victims for
negligent acts or to punish willful acts and whether the statutory language
The legislative history suggests
ameliorates any feasor wrongdoing.2 38
239
and proscription of self-dealing. 240 But ERISA
punishment of skulduggery
provides amelioration through insurance. 24' The Supreme Court holds that the
language of this remedy provides compensation only for the plan, not a
participant, much less a fiduciary.242
234. See Free v. Briody, 732 F.2d 1331, 1336 (7th Cir. 1984); see also Donovan v. Robbins, 752
F.2d 1170, 1178 (7th Cir. 1985) (Posner assumed the result applies in using the proportionate fault rule
to limit a non-settling fiduciary's right to contribution), 1183-86 (Coffey, J., concurring, reiterating the
Free analysis to counter Posner's proportionate rule); Alton Mem'l Hosp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 656
F.2d 245, 250 (7th Cir. 1981) (dicta); Freund v. Marshall & Ilsley Bank, 485 F. Supp. 629, 635 n.1
(W.D. Wis. 1979) (same); Lumpkin v. Envirodyne Indus., Inc., 933 F.2d 449, 453 (7th Cir. 1991)
(stating non-settling fiduciary has no right to contribution after application of the proportionate rule).
See supra note 82 and accompanying text for the proportionate rule. In Free a participant sued cotrustees, the controlling trustee for prohibited transactions and transfers to a purported investment
advisor contrary to advise and the inactive trustee, a friend and insurance agent for the controlling
trustee, for failure to supervise and control plan assets. The controlling trustee filed for bankruptcy. The
inactive trustee cross-claimed against the controlling trustee. Free, 732 F.2d 1331 (quoting Alton Mem'l
Hosp. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 656 F.2d 245, 250 (7th Cir. 1981)).
235. See Free, 732 F.2d at 1336.
236. See id. at 1336.
237. See id. at 1337; Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 409(a), 502(a)(2), (3),
29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a) ("such other equitable or remedial relief') & 1132(a)(2) (1999) ("appropriate relief
under section 1109").
238. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
239. See supra notes 204-17 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 220 and accompanying text.
241. See supra notes 153-68 and accompanying text.
242. See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985). The statutory
provision states:
Any person who is a fiduciary with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities,
obligations, or duties imposed upon fiduciaries by this title shall be personally liable to make
good to such plan any losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such
plan any profits of such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the
fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate, including removal of such fiduciary.
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a) (1999). In
interpreting "such other equitable or remedial relief' in the second clause for a beneficiary's damage
action for improper claims processing, the Supreme Court focused on the remedy limitation in the first
clause "to such plan" and "of such plan" in the first clause to rule such limitation also applied to the
second clause, ignoring its separation from such language by the comma and the repetition of "shall".
See Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 473 U.S. at 140. Realizing its mistake, the Supreme Court
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The court found secondly that the legislative history of ERISA indicated an
intent to codify the principles of traditional trust law, which includes
contribution and indemnity. 43 This conclusion overstates the legislative history.
That history clearly labels traditional trust law as a source, but requires
modification to fit ERISA.244 And the Seventh Circuit made no analysis as to
whether contribution and indemnity fits the ERISA modified trust law.
The court found thirdly that the structure of ERISA revealed a purpose to
prevent trustees from acting as insurers of co-fiduciary actions by limiting cofiduciary liability to three circumstances and allowing the fiduciaries to allocate
various functions and avoid liability for breaches allocated to another
fiduciary.2 45 The liability limitation noted by the Seventh Circuit does not
indicate a desire not to have fiduciaries as insurers. Rather it reflects one of the
major reasons for deviation from traditional trust law - namely, the large
amounts of money contained in the plans. So these delegation and limitation
provisions fragment the liability so as not to exceed the assets of the fiduciary.
In other words, each fiduciary could be the insurer of a portion of the plan's
assets or administration.
The court did not deal with the fourth factor since ERISA preemption of
state law is statutory.246 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit reversed the district
court's dismissal of the contribution and indemnity cross-claim.24 7
The Seventh Circuit's rationale has not significantly influenced subsequent
courts due to the Supreme Court's misinterpretation of the ERISA fiduciary
breach remedy relied upon by the Seventh Circuit.248 The Supreme Court read
ERISA's fiduciary breach section as providing only the plan a remedy.249
Consequently, one renegade district court judge in the Seventh Circuit has
concluded co-fiduciaries have no right to contribution and indemnity under
ERISA. 250 Never the less, other judges in district courts in the Seventh Circuit

subsequently has authorized beneficiary reinstatement in welfare plans for the fiduciary breach of
supplying misinformation, not under Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 409(a) &
502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a), 1132(a)(2) (1999), but under "other appropriate equitable relief' of
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1999). See
Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 509-10 (1996). In other words a fiduciary breach warrants
recovery by the plan under ERISA § 502(a)(2) and by the beneficiary under ERISA § 502(a)(3)(B).
243. See Free, 732 F.2d at 1337; see supra note 219 and accompanying text for codification of
traditional trust law and supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text for traditional trust law.
244. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
245. See Free, 732 F.2d at 1337; see supra notes 136-43 and accompanying text for the structure of
co-fiduciary liability and the separation technique of avoiding liability.
246. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144
(2000).
247. See Free, 732 F.2d at 1338. Subsequent courts, however, have described this conclusion as
dicta. See Donvan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1178 (7th Cir. 1985); Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. v.
Yampol, 706 F. Supp. 596, 599 (N.D. 111.1989) (so the court could dismiss the opinion as not binding
and find no ERISA right to contribution and indemnity).
248. See Yampol, 706 F. Supp. at 598-599 (rejecting Free v. Briody, due to the Supreme Court
pronouncement).
249. See supra note 242 and accompanying text.
250. See Yampol, 706 F. Supp. at 596 (Leinenweber, J.); accord Plumbers Local 93 Health and
Welfare Pension Fund v. Dipietro Plumbing Co., No. 94-C-7378, 1999 WL 301666 *4 (N.D. Il1. Apr.
30, 1991) (Leinenweber following Yampol). In Yampol the claims administrator, as assignee of the trust
liquidator, brought suit against the trustees for breaches of fiduciary duty. The trustees cross-claimed
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252
continue to follow the directive 251 as has a district court in the Fourth Circuit.
A district court in the Ninth 253 Circuit has revised the Seventh Circuit's rationale
and followed it. That district court avoided the Ninth Circuit's pronouncement

that ERISA does not include contribution and indemnity 254 by noting that those

opinions dealt with claims under ERISA for fiduciary breach 255 and not for
"other appropriate equitable relief' to redress violations. 6 Using the Seventh
Circuit rationale, the court only need consider whether contribution and
indemnity fits the statutory language of ERISA for "other appropriate equitable
relief', namely they are equitable and seek to redress violations of the plan, the
first step of the Seventh Circuit's analysis. The court found the remedy
equitable.2 57 And miscalculation dealt with plan terms.258 So ERISA permits
contribution and indemnity.
B.

IMPLIED CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY REMEDY BARRED

The Ninth Circuit is the leading proponent that ERISA does not permit
contribution and indemnity.25 9 Since the paying fiduciary counterclaimed under
ERISA's fiduciary breach action, the Ninth Circuit viewed the action as one
involving statutory construction for breach of fiduciary duty for which the

and brought a third-party claim against the investment advisors. In Plumbers Local 93 the trustees
brought an action against one successor employer for delinquent contributions of the original employer.
The successor employer, as a non-settling fiduciary, claimed the right of contribution under the
proportionate rule. See infra note 82 and accompanying text for the proportionate rule. Yampol's
rationale followed Free, 732 F.2d at 1336-38, except it found no statutory language in ERISA , no
ERISA legislative history, and, in light of Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Co., 473 U.S. 134, no statutory
purpose or structure supportive of contribution and indemnity.
251. See Harris Trust & Savings Bank v. Salomon Brothers, Inc., 832 F. Supp. 1169, 1177-79 (N.D.
Ill. 1993) (following Lumpkin, 933 F.2d at 464); Anderson v. Rockford Products Corp., No. 92C 20125, 1992 WL 390781 *4 (N.D. I11.Dec. 22, 1992) (following Free, 732 F.2d at 1337). In Harris the
trustees brought an action against the investment advisor for knowingly participating in a fiduciary
breach by another fiduciary. The investment advisor counterclaimed for contribution. In Anderson a
beneficiary sued the employer for denial of benefits. The employer filed a third-party claim against the
outside administrator for failing to investigate the claim, failing to keep records of the claim denial, and
failing to act in accordance with industry standards.
252. See Brock v. Gillikin, 677 F. Supp. 398, 402 (E.D.N.C. 1987) (following Free, 732 F.2d at
1337). In Gillikin, the Department of Labor sued the trustee for breach of the exclusive benefit rule and
engaging in prohibited transactions. The trustee brought a third-party action against the employer for
indemnification. The court denied relief since the employer was the inactive fiduciary. Id.
253. See Youngberg v. Bekins Co., 930 F. Supp. 1396, 1398 (E.D. Cal. 1996). In Youngberg, a
beneficiary sued the employer and outside plan administrator for denied benefits due to a miscalculation.
The employer cross-claimed against the plan administrator for indemnification. Id.
254. See infra notes 259-65 and accompanying text.
255. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §§ 409(a) & 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§
1109(a) & 1132(a)(2) (2000).
256. Youngberg, 930 F. Supp. at 1399-1400; Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, §

502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (1999).
257. Youngberg, 930 F. Supp. at 1400 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)).
258. Youngberg, 930 F. Supp. at 1401.
259. See Kim v. Fujikawa, 871 F.2d 1427, 1432 (9thCir. 1989); accord Call v. Sumitomo Bank of
Calif., 881 F.2d 626, 630-31 (9thCir. 1989). In Kim, a management trustee of a multi-employer plan
sued a union trustee for using plan funds to pay union salaries. The court assessed the union trustee with
the entire cost of the prohibited transaction. The union trustee counter-sued for contribution from the
management trustee and brought a third-party claim against the other plan trustees. Kim, 871 F.2d at
1432. For the facts of Call,see supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court has decreed only the plan may recover. 260 So a breaching
fiduciary can have no equitable remedy of contribution. 26' District courts in the
Ninth Circuit have followed this conclusion even when the fiduciary brings a
counterclaim or third-party action under another section of ERISA.2 62
The Ninth Circuit, fearing that following the Supreme Court's mistake
under the fiduciary breach remedy alone might not convince, went further and
investigated two of the factors from the implication method. The Ninth Circuit
noted that Congress enacted ERISA to protect participants, not fiduciaries.26 3
This observation failed to investigate the possibility of an indirect benefit to
participants from apportionment of liability amongst culpable fiduciaries. The
Ninth Circuit then concluded that adding the additional remedy of contribution
and indemnity would not comport with the Supreme Court's alleged reticulated
ERISA remedial scheme.264 The issue for finding contribution and indemnity in
a preemptive federal statute is not whether the remedy would add to the statutory
scheme, but whether Congress designed the statutory scheme to compensate
victims for negligent acts or to punish willful acts and whether the statutory
265
scheme ameliorates any feasor wrongdoing.
District Courts in the Eighth266 and Eleventh2 67 Circuits have followed this
lead. Some courts in the Fourth, 268 Fifth,2 69 and Sixth 270 Circuits have concurred
260. SeeKim, 871 F.2d at 1431.
261. See id. at 1432.
262. See Meoli v. American Medical Services of San Diego, 35 F. Supp. 2d 761, 763-64 (S.D. Cal.
1999) (extending the rationale of Kim to actions under Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974, § 502(a)(3)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3)(B) (1999), and to indemnity); Moreland v. Behl, 1995 WL
150579, *4 (N.D. Cal.) (reasoning of Kim, 871 F.2d at 1432 applies); Rossio v. Massachusetts Mutual
Life Ins. Co., 789 F. Supp. 1047 (E.D. Cal. 1992) (same); contraYoungberg v. Bekins Co., 930 F. Supp.
1396, 1401 (E.D. Cal. 1996). In Meoli, participants sued the trustees and plan administrators for
mismanagement. The trustees and plan administrators counterclaimed against certain participants who
served on an advisory committee for failure to direct the trustees, to give notices with respect to the plan,
and to remedy participant filed grievances. Meoli, 35 F.Supp. at 2. In Moreland,individual clients of an
accountant sued the seller of Voluntary Employee Benefit Association programs for breaches of
fiduciary duty and prohibited transactions. The seller filed a third-party claim against the accountant for
contribution and indemnity. Moreland, 1995 WL 150579 at * 1. In Rossio, the trustees sued the sponsor
of aproto-type plan and the outside plan administrators. The sponsor counterclaimed against the trustees
and cross-claimed against the administrators for contribution and indemnity. Rossio, 789 F.Supp. at
1048-50. For the facts of Youngberg, see supra note 253.
263. See Kim, 871 F.2d at 1433. The Ninth Circuit bolstered this conclusion by noting that
Congress intended ERISA to regulate fiduciaries, not to soften their liability for wrongdoing. Id.at
1433.
264. See id. at 1432. The reticulated remedy scheme comes from Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Russell ,473 U.S. 134, 176 (1984).
265. See supranotes 59-61 and accompanying text.
266. See Physicians Healthchoice, Inc. v. Trustees of Automotive Employee Ben. Trust., 764 F.
Supp. 1360 (D. Minn. 1991) (following Kim, 871 F.2d at 1432); Hunt v. Magnell, 766 F. Supp. 727 (D.
Minn. 1990) (same). In Physicians Healthchoice, the plan administrator sued the plan trustees for
mismanagement. The trustees counterclaimed for contribution and indemnity. PhysiciansHealthchoice,
764 F.Supp. at 1361. In Hunt, participants sued trustees for risky investments. The trustees brought
third-party claims for contribution against the plan administrator. Hunt, 766 F.Supp. at 728.
267. See Hollingshead v. Burford Equipment Co., 747 F. Supp. 1421 (M.D. Ala. 1990) (following
the rationale of Kim, 871 F.2d at 1432.). In Hollingshead, participants sued the employer contending the
employer had established a plan. The employer brought a third-party complaint against a director for
indemnification. Hollingshead,747 F.Supp. at 1425.
268. See NARDA., Inc. v. Rhode Island Hosp. Trust Nat'l Bank, 744 F. Supp. 685, 695-98 (D. Md.
1990). In NARDA the association-sponsor of a self-funded welfare plan sued the service provider Bank
that collected the payments for premiums, the administrator, and the insurance company for
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in the conclusion. Two of these district courts changed the argument to fit the
ERISA remedy for violation of plan terms. 27' These courts contended this
remedy did not apply to a fiduciary breach as did the ERISA fiduciary breach
remedy.272 These courts concluded that fiduciaries do not need contribution and
indemnity since (1) they are only liable as fiduciaries to the extent they exercise
discretion, (2) they have narrower co-fiduciary liability than under traditional
273
trust law, and (3) they can allocate responsibility and thereby limit liability.
This analysis again fails to confront the issues needed to determine whether
Congress included contribution and indemnity in a preemptive federal statute.
Some courts in the Ninth Circuit have tried to get around their Circuit's ban
on contribution and indemnity. One method allows indemnity by limiting the
facts of the Ninth Circuit's cases to their facts, which involved contribution.274
Another method is to bring a suit or cross-claim against the co-fiduciary on
behalf of the plan for breach of fiduciary duty, rather than a third party claim or
cross claim for contribution and indemnity, a technique approved by the Ninth
Circuit. 275 This technique, however, does not work for all fiduciaries. Former
fiduciaries lack standing to bring an ERISA action.2 76

mismanagement of the funds. The defendants counterclaimed against the association, which along with
the Bank sought indemnification. Id. At 687-88.
269. See Lawrence v. Jackson Mach. Sales, Inc., 837 F. Supp. 771, 791 (S.D. Miss. 1992)
(following a non-fiduciary contribution case); Schloegel v. Boswell, 766 F. Supp. 563, 565 (S.D. Miss.
1991) (agreeing with MutualLife Ins. Co. ofNew York v.Yampol, 706 F. Supp. 596 (N.D. Ill. 1989), the
renegade Seventh Circuit opinion ). In Lawrence, a participant sued the employer and insurance
company administrator for benefits due under COBRA. The employer cross-claimed against the
insurance company. Lawrence, 837 F.Supp. at 775-77. In Schloegel, a participant and plan sued an
insurance agent for mis-advice concerning a life insurance investment for his profit-sharing account.
The agent counter-sued the plan and brought a third-party action against the employer. Schloegel, 766
F.Supp. at 564-65.
270. See Roberts v. Taussig, 39 F. Supp. 2d 1010 (N.D. Ohio 1999) (following NARDA, 744 F.
Supp. at 695-98 and Schloegel, 766 F. Supp. at 567); Daniels v. Nat'l Employee Benefit Servs., Inc., 877
F. Supp. 1067, 1074 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (following Schloegel, 766 F.Supp. at 563; and Yampol, 706
F.Supp. at 596). In Roberts, a former plan administrator sued the employer for diverting sale proceeds
from an employee stock ownership plan. The employer counterclaimed for equitable indemnification.
Roberts, 39 F.Supp. at 1010. In Daniels, plan trustees sued the plan administrator for fraudulently
selling securities to the plans while receiving commissions. The plan administrator cross-claimed
against the trustees. Daniels, 877 F.Supp. at 1069-70.
271. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(3) (1999).
272. Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 409(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1109(a)
(1999). This conclusion is erroneous. One of the fiduciary duties is to follow the plan terms. Employee
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974, § 405(a)(l)(D), 20 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(l)(D) (1999).
273. See NARDA, 744 F. Supp. at 698; Roberts, 39 F. Supp. 2d at 1012 (following NARDA, 774
F.Supp. 685 (D. Md. 1990)).
274. See Youngberg v. Bekins Co., 930 F. Supp. 1396 (E.D. Cal. 1996); but see Meoli v. American
Medical Servs. of San Diego, 35 F. Supp. 2d 761 (S.D. Cal. 1999) (rejecting the distinction); but cf
Schloegel v. Boswell, 766 F. Supp. 563 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (agreeing with the Fifth Circuit).
275. See Concha v. London, 62 F.3d 1493, 1500 (9th Cir. 1995); Schraeder v. Hamilton, 959 F.
Supp. 1205, 1208 & 1210 n.8 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
276. See, e.g., Corbin v. Blankenberg, 39 F.3d 650, 652-53 (6thCir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S.
1192 (1995) (no abatement of suit brought while a fiduciary since successor takes over); Chemung Canal
Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Maryland, 939 F.2d 12, 14 (2d Cir. 1991); Blackmar v. Lichtenstein, 603 F.3d
1306, 1310 (8th Cir. 1979).
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C. CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNITY ALLOWED AS A TRADITIONAL TRUST LAW
REMEDY

The Second Circuit is the leading proponent that ERISA allows
contribution and indemnity.277 Since the paying fiduciary conceded that ERISA
had no language for contribution and indemnity and presented the issue as one of
implying the remedy, the Second Circuit noted Supreme Court pronouncements
directing the federal courts to develop a federal common law of ERISA and to
apply principles of the common law of trusts to ERISA fiduciaries.27 8
Concluding that the federal courts were authorized to use traditional trust law in
fashioning that federal common law, the Second Circuit noted that a universally
recognized trust law permits contribution and indemnity. 279 So ERISA includes
the right of contribution and indemnity. This conclusion again overstates the
legislative history, which clearly labels traditional trust law as a source, but
requires modification to fit ERISA. 280 The Second Circuit then noted that such a
remedy had no financial impact on participants, comported with the fairness
principle that liability should lie with those responsible, and avoided liability
based solely on the plaintiffs choice of defendant. 281 This observation reveals
the real problem with denying contribution and indemnity. It runs counter to the
282
American sense of fairness.
The Second Circuit's majority opinion, however, spawned a dissent. The
dissent felt that Congress had considered the matter and had not provided the
remedy. 283
The co-fiduciary liability provision evidenced Congressional
awareness of the problem and language of incorporating traditional trust law
revealed Congressional awareness of the remedy. But the dissenter did not
delineate any language or provisions counter to contribution and indemnity.
Consequently, district courts in the Second Circuit have followed the majority's
conclusion.2 84
277. See Chemung Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Maryland, 939 F.2d 12, 16 (2d Cir. 1991); see
also In re Masters, Mates & Pilots Pension Plan, 957 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1992) (settlement without
approval of non-settling co-fiduciaries is improper because it precluded their subsequently seeking
contribution if themselves adjudged liable); Dardaganis v. Grace Capital, Inc., 889 F.2d 1237, 1241 (2d
Cir. 1989) (stating in dicta that trustees might be liable for separate suits for contribution or indemnity
brought by co-fiduciaries). In Chemung Canal Trust Co., the original trustee engaged in imprudent
investments and prohibited transactions. The second succeeding trustee brought an action against the
first succeeding trustee for recovery of losses from lack of prudence with respect to the original
investments. The first succeeding trustee, if found liable, sought contribution and indemnity from the
employer for failing to monitor the original trustee and the second succeeding trustee for not adequately
pursuing the plan's claims.
278. See Chemung Canal Trust Co., 939 F.2d at 16 (Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41
(1987) for the directive and Firestone Tire and Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489 U.S. 101 (1989) for using trust
law).
279. See Chemung Canal Trust Co., 939 F.2d at 16 (citing the Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 258
(1959) and George Gleason Bogert, The Law of Trusts and Trustees, § 701 (2d ed. Rev. 1982)).
280. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
281. See Chemung Canal Trust Co., 939 F.2d at 16.
282. See Posner, supra note 94, at 313-15 (describing Aristotle's corrective justice remedy
applicable to torts and contracts as taking away the gain of the feasor or restoring equality); ARISTOTLE,
NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS 121 (Martin Ostwald, trans., Bobbs-Merrill ed., 1962).
283. See Chemung Canal Trust Co., 939 F.2d at 18-19.
284. See Brock v. Group Legal Administrators, Inc., 702 F. Supp. 475, 476 (S.D.N.Y. 1989)
(contribution and indemnity are equitable actions so no jury trial). In Brock the Department of Labor
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District courts in the First 285 and Third 286 Circuits also have followed the
lead of the majority in the Second Circuit. So have some district courts in the
Fourth,2 87 Fifth 288 and Eleventh 289 Circuits. A district court in the Tenth
Circuit 290 has concurred in the conclusion. That district court used the four-

factor analysis of the Supreme Court's implication method.291 For the four
points, the court found firstly Congress designated the participants as the
protected class and contribution and indemnification indirectly benefits them by
enhancing the deterrent effect. Secondly, there is evidence Congress intended to
incorporate traditional trust law into ERISA. This conclusion again overstates
the legislative history, which clearly labels traditional trust law as a source, but
requires modification to fit ERISA.292 Thirdly, the remedy is consistent with the
statute by providing a remedial relationship between co-fiduciaries as well as
those stated in ERISA. This analysis again fails to confront the issues needed to
determine whether Congress included contribution and indemnity in a
preemptive federal statute.293 The issue for finding contribution and indemnity
in a preemptive federal statute is not whether the remedy does not comport with
the statutory scheme, but whether Congress designed the statutory scheme to
sued the trustees for restitution for purchasing a prepaid legal services contract and failing to monitor the
actions of the service provider. The trustees cross-claimed against the service provider. Id.
285. See Duncan v. Santaniello, 900 F. Supp. 547, 550 (D. Mass. 1995) (relying on the analysis of
Chemung Canal Trust Co., 939 F.2d at 16). In Duncan the current trustees brought an action against the
lawyers advising the former trustees concerning a prohibited transaction entered into without a
Department of Labor ruling. The lawyers brought a third-party action for contribution and indemnity
against the former trustees. The lawyers had counseled against the transaction unless the plan obtained a
Department of Labor exemption ruling and had so prepared the documents.
286. See McCurdy v. Wedgewood Capital Management Co., Inc., 1999 W.L. 554590 (E.D. Pa.)
(relying on the analysis of Chemung Canal Trust Co., 939 F.2d at 16); Green v. William Mason & Co.,
976 F. Supp. 298, 301 (D.N.J. 1997) (same); Cohen v. Baker, 845 F. Supp. 289, 291 (E.D. Pa. 1994)
(same). In McCurdy the trustee sued the investment manager. The investment manager brought a thirdparty action against the investment advisor and its own chief investment officer during the relevant time
period. In Green the trustees sued the investment advisor and investment manager concerning certain
inappropriate investments. The investment advisor counterclaimed for contribution and indemnity
against the trustees since they had access to the same information as the investment advisor and failed to
prevent the plan losses. In Cohen the beneficiaries sued the trustees for investments in certificate of
deposits over the federally guaranteed amount. The trustees brought a third-party action for contribution
and indemnity against the beneficiaries, as administrators, since they selected the investment vehicle.
287. See Cooper v. Kossan, 993 F. Supp. 375 (E.D. Va. 1998) (relying on the analysis of Chemung
Canal Trust Co. v. Sovran Bank/Maryland, 939 F.2d 12, 16 (2nd Cir. 1991). In Cooper participants
sued one trustee for moneys borrowed. That trustee brought a third-party claim against another trustee
for contribution. Id.
288. See Maher v. Strachan Shipping Co., 817 F. Supp. 43, 44 (E.D. La. 1993) (adopting analysis of
the Second Circuit). In Maher beneficiaries sued the employer for terminating the plan and purchasing
an annuity benefit. The employer filed a third-party complaint against the outside plan administrator for
aiding and abetting and recommending the purchase. Id.
289. See Jones v. Trevor, Stewart, Burton and Jacobsen, Inc., 1992 WL 252137 (N.D. Ga. 1992)
(adopting the analysis of Chemung Canal Trust Co., 939 F.2d at 16). In Jones the trustees sued a former
investment manager for mismanagement. The investment manager counterclaimed against the trustees
and investment advisor for contribution and indemnity for inadequate monitoring and advisement. Id.
290. See Emmons v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 799 F. Supp. 1123, 1125
(D. N.M. 1992) (noting the analysis of Chemung Canal Trust Co., 939 F.2d at 16). In Emmons a
beneficiary sued the employer and outside plan administrator for terminating his disability coverage
when the plan administrator had never advised of continuation options. The employer cross-claimed
against the plan administrator for indemnity.
291. See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78(1975).
292. See supra note 221 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
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compensate victims for negligent acts or to punish willful acts and whether the
statutory scheme ameliorates any feasor wrongdoing.29 4 Fourthly, state law is
preempted by ERISA expressly.

D.

OPINIONS OF THE COMMENTATORS

Various commentators have examined the issue of whether ERISA includes
a remedy of contribution and indemnity for breaching fiduciaries. The early
commentators, law students, favored allowing contribution and indemnity. The
later commentators, practitioners and law professors, opposed extending
contribution and indemnity to ERISA. None have examined the indemnity and
exculpation provisions of ERISA in their analysis.
They also make no
distinction between equitable contribution and indemnity and legal contribution
and indemnity.
1.

Favorable Commentators

The earliest commentator appeared shortly after the Ninth Circuit's opinion
295
denying contribution requested under "appropriate relief' for fiduciary breach.
Consequently, the commentator confined his comments to contribution. 96 This
commentator had two arguments favoring contribution for ERISA, both focusing
on "other appropriate equitable relief' to redress violations of ERISA or the
plan.2 97 The Supreme Court's pronouncement that only the plan can recover
under the fiduciary breach action does not apply to this section.298 The first
argument dealt with the express language. Since contribution is an equitable
remedy, at least for a trustee's breach of fiduciary duty, it is "equitable".2 99
Allowing contribution to a passive trustee is "appropriate". 300 This conclusion
ignores the ERISA co-fiduciary liability provisions, which the courts claim
require some monitoring and are violated by mere inattentiveness, that is, being
30 1
passive.
The second argument involved implication of the remedy. Using the above
language for the statutory language requirement and skipping over the structure
of the statute requirement, this commentator dwelled on legislative history,
namely the pronouncements for the "full range of legal and equitable remedies,"
the statements concerning the incorporation of traditional trust law, and the
directive to develop federal common law.30 2 Since contribution is within the
294. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
295. See Paul James Hunt, Bucking the Trend: An Argument in Favor of a Fiduciary'sImplied Right
to Contribution Under ERISA, 76 VA. L. REV. 1377 (1990); see also Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 §§ 409(a) & 502(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1109(a) & 1132(a)(2) (1999).
296. See Hunt, supra note 295, at 1377 n.2.
297. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) of 1974 § 502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C. §
1132(a)(3) (1999).
298. See Hunt, supra note 295, at 1387.
299. See id. at 1396-97.
300. See id. at 1397.
301. See supra notes 137-38 and accompanying text.
302. See Hunt, supra note 295, at 1399-1401. For a discussion of the "full range" of remedies, see
Flint, supra note 218, at 642-59. For a discussion of the incorporation of traditional trust law, see supra
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ambit of trust law, a court may imply the remedy.30 3 The function of the
legislative history requirement of the Supreme Court's implication method is to
locate something relative to contribution and indemnity, that is apportionment or
reimbursement. Mere statements of a general nature are not sufficient to
convince.
This law student commentator then provided three policy reasons for
allowing contribution for ERISA actions, namely the contribution action would
(1) produce more evidence to prove the breach of fiduciary duty action from the
fiduciary trying to shift the loss, (2) remove collusion between the plaintiff and
the active breaching fiduciary to sue the passive fiduciary, and (3) avoid nondeterrence by a fiduciary willing to gamble it will not be the one sued.3° This
commentator never examined the structure of ERISA to determine either
"appropriateness" for the express language argument or as an element of the
implication argument.
The second commentator focused on policy arguments to determine that
ERISA should include contribution and indemnity, whether by court decision or
Congressional legislation.30 5 Since the court's task is to fathom Congressional
intentions for ERISA, her comments are not likely to bear heavily on the judges.
This commentator considered three policies, one against contribution, namely
the efficiency requirement, and two for contribution, namely the fairness
doctrine and the historical trend. This commentator outlined the law-andeconomic jurisprudential school's position against contribution for torts,
examines its assumptions, and shows their inapplicability to ERISA fiduciary
breaches.30 6 She noted that the Supreme Court has rejected efficiency as a
reason to oppose contribution for the admiralty laws.30 7 She also noted that,
other than for misappropriation of plan funds, ERISA fiduciary breaches yield
little profit to the fiduciary and so fiduciaries will view the penalty of total
liability as excessive, increasing plan costs counter to one of ERISA's
purposes.30 8
This commentator's examination of the fairness doctrine indicated that
ERISA acerbates the unfairness of a no contribution rule. 30 9 Among the
acerbations are (1) the inability of former fiduciaries to bring a lawsuit under
ERISA so they can not avail themselves of the alternative technique described
above to hold the other fiduciaries liable,31 0 (2) collusive settlements under a no
contribution rule where a favored defendant exchanges information for a small
amount for an agreement not to sue, leaving the other fiduciaries with a greater
liability, a situation likely to be endemic with ERISA's fractionalized
notes 180-203 and accompanying text. For a discussion of the development of federal common law, see
id at 970-78.
303. See Hunt, supra note 295, at 1402-03.
304. See id at 1405-06.
305. See Di Cola, supra note 6.
306. See id at 1553-62; see also supra notes 86-93 and accompanying text.
307. See Di Cola, supra note 6, at 1561; see also supra note 52.
308. See Di Cola, supra note 6, at 1571-73.
309. Seeid. at 1562-71.
310. See id. at 1565-67; see also supra note 276 and accompanying text.
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fiduciaries, 31 ' (3) "whipsaw" settlement tactics forcing higher settlements to
avoid being the last one holding the bag, a tactic already used by the Department
of Labor in ERISA actions,3 12 and (4) the inability to escape liability by
appointing an expert to handle the matter due to ERISA's requirement to
monitor the expert.3t 3
Lastly, this law-student commentator noted that the historical trend is
toward allowing contribution, noting the cases of torts, securities laws, and the
environmental laws. 3 14 Unfortunately, she saw only the anti-trust laws as an
anomaly, 315 overlooking the other fields, some of which include the securities
laws.31 6 Again this commentator did not examine the structure of the statute for
clues on the issue.
The third commentator 317 noted further acerbations, namely (1) the
fractionalization of ERISA fiduciaries renders liable those not knowing they are
fiduciaries and hence do not purchase fiduciary liability insurance 3 1 and (2)
ERISA preemption, which prevents319 application of traditional trust law's
contribution and indemnity remedies.
This commentator then proceeded with the Supreme Court's directions, to
imply the remedy from the language of the statute or under the federal common
law. For the implication argument this commentator focused both on the
language for breach of a fiduciary duty, limiting derogatory remarks of the
Supreme Court and limiting the section to remedies of the plan to the facts of
that case, namely it applies only to extra-contractual damages, and the language
for violations of the statute or plan. 320 He also asserted that since contribution
and indemnity are procedural devices to give substance to another remedy,
namely the right for the plan to recover, that the strict implication requirements
of the Supreme Court do not apply. 321 For the legislative intent this
commentator relied on the full range of legal and equitable remedies language
and codification of traditional trust law language. 322 As for the purposes of
ERISA, this commentator claimed that allowing contribution will facilitate
making the plan whole since more deep pockets will be available. 323 This
advantage may be insignificant, since the plan can sue as many fiduciaries as
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

See Di Cola, supra note 6, at 1567-68.
See id.at 1568-69.
See id at 1570-71; see also supra notes 138 & 194 and accompanying text.
See Di Cola, supra note 6, at 1575-85.
Seeid. at 1586-89.
See supra notes 54-58 and accompanying text.
See John A. Pereira, Note, A Fiduciary'sRight to Contributionor Indemnity Under ERISA, 21

OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 507 (1996).

318. See id. at 531; see, e.g.,Chapman v. Klemick, 750 F. Supp. 520, 524 (S.D. Fla. 1990) (finding
beneficiary's attorney a plan fiduciary where attorney advised client not to pay insurance recoveries
under subrogation agreement with plan since beneficiary was judgment proof and could declare
bankruptcy, thus deterring the plan from suing under the subrogation agreement).
319. See Pereira, supra note 317, at 532.
320. See id. at 542, 546 & 557.
321. See id.
322. See id. at 549.
323. See id at 551; see Arthur H. Kroll, ERISA Fiduciaries' Rights of Contribution, 7 OCT
PROBATE & PROPERTY 39,40 (1993).
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needed until recovery is complete, and failing to do so due to under-settlements
would make the current fiduciaries liable.
For the federal common law argument, this law student commentator relied
on language in a concurrence that "other appropriate equitable relief' is a license
to fine tune ERISA's remedial scheme and language in a court syllabus that
principles of trust law must guide the court. 2 4 Consequently, this commentator
concluded that the no contribution rule fails to follow the guide of the principles
of trust law.325 This commentator, however, did not investigate the exculpation
provisions. For him they constituted merely an amelioration of the acerbations
caused by ERISA.326
2.

Unfavorable Commentators

The more recent commentators adopted a position opposite to the lawstudent commentators. But they were interested solely in the federal common
law, and so their comments on the issue of contribution and indemnity were brief
and served only as a part of a larger criticism.
The earliest of these commentators attacked a few of the points of the last
student commentator. A court needed more than a mere lack of Congressional
prohibition to imply contribution and indemnity. 327 Adding to the Second
Circuit's dissent, this commentator noted that Congress thought of the problem
when it provided co-fiduciary liability. Consequently, Congressional awareness
of the problem and subsequent provision for a remedial scheme that makes no
mention of contribution and indemnity shows Congressional intent against
providing that remedy. 328 For this commentator the contribution and indemnity
rule is not a collateral or subsidiary rule, but a conscious policy of a court to act
329
contrary to the Congressional choice not to allow sharing of liability.
Moreover, if Congress wanted traditional trust law to guide, then there would
have been no reason to lay out a remedial scheme.330 Congress could just say
previous state remedies were still available under ERISA. 331 But Congress did
not incorporate traditional trust law, only some parts. 332 Again this commentator
did not investigate the exculpation and insurance provisions as providing a
remedy contrary to contribution and indemnity.
The crux of this professorial commentator's position was the statement
made by Javits concerning the development of the federal common law of

324. See Pereira, supra note 317, at 562 (citing Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473
U.S. 134, 155 (1985) (Brennan, J., concurring)), 564 (citing Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Bruch, 489
U.S. 101, 102 (1989)).
325. See id. at 566.
326. See id. at 532.
327. See Jeffrey A. Brauch, The Federal Common Law of ERISA, 21 HARV. J. OF LAW & PUB.
POL'Y 541, 590 (1998).

328. See id.
329. Seeid. at591.
330. See id.
331. See id.
332. See id. (citing S. Rep. No. 93-127 containing language about "certain principles" and "with
modifications"); see also supra note 219 and accompanying text for the language of the Senate Report.
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ERISA by the courts.333 He rejected the authority to fashion federal common
law, calling it a delegation, since it made by a single member of Congress.33 4
This position ignores the fact that Senator Javits was more than a single
legislator, or sponsor of a bill. He was the motivating force behind the bill,
including its drafting, and as a result is the spokesman of the drafters. 335 This
commentator's position is merely a reflection of the English practice of rejecting
legislative history to interpret statutes based on the idea that a court can not
impute the intent of one legislator to the body.336
The most recent commentator, a practitioner, raised three points. 337 Firstly,
338
contribution and indemnity are inconsistent with the detailed liability rules.
Without providing support, this commentator asserted it is inappropriate for a
court (1) to assume additional rights and remedies given the broad sweep of the
liability rules and (2) to read a few references to the traditional law of trusts to
allow a remedy not contemplated by Congress. 339 Secondly, there is no reason
for courts to believe that the authorization to make federal common law extends
to areas with no relation to the stated purposes. 340 This is not exactly correct.
Courts have the power to fill interstices in the common law. Thirdly, the
Supreme Court's test for implication of the remedy are not satisfied: fiduciaries
are not the protected class, the structure makes no mention of contribution and
indemnity, the legislative history is silent, and there is no state interest at
issue.341 The ERISA statutory structure, however, does prohibit indemnity
agreements. 342 The law-and-economics jurisprudential school noted that there
must be some state interest in favor of contribution
and note it occurs most
343
heavily in those states with a large social program.
IV. THE SOLUTION
In order to determine whether ERISA authorizes the court to allow a
contribution or indemnity lawsuit by one fiduciary against another, the Supreme
Court has specified consideration of various factors among several different
approaches.344 The courts and commentators have examined these factors, come
to different conclusions, and have yet to come up with a solution that has gained

333. See Brauch, supra note 327, at 550, 558-63; see also 120 Cong. Rec. S29942 (daily ed. Aug.
22, 1974) (quoting statement of Sen. Javits: "It is also intended that a body of federal substantive law
will be developed by the courts to deal with issues involving rights and obligations under private welfare
and pension plans.").
334. See Brauch, supranote 327, at 558 (disparaging the statement as made by a single legislator).
335. See supra notes 209-17 and accompanying text.
336. See George Lee Flint, Jr., ERISA: Nonwaivability of Preemption, 39 U. KAN. L. REv. 297, 326
n. 209 & 326-37.
337. See Michael J. Collins, It's Common, but Is It Right? The Common Law of Trusts in ERISA
FiduciaryLitigation, 16 LAB. LAW. 391 (2001).
338. Seeid at416.
339. Seeid. at417.
340. See id. at418.
341. See id at418-19.
342. See supra notes 146-47 and accompanying text.
343. See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 46, at 219-24.
344. See supra notes 229-30 and accompanying text for the approaches and their factors.
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dominance.345 With respect to the statutory language, the best they have come
up with is "appropriate relief' of the fiduciary breach action and "other
appropriate equitable relief' of the action to redress a statutory or plan
violation.346 With respect to the statutory structure, the best they have come up
with is a reticulated remedial scheme authorizing lawsuits.347 With respect to
legislative history the best they have exhumed is a few statements on traditional
trust law and the ability to fashion federal common law.34 8 Nothing
overwhelming. They have not discovered the ERISA prohibitions against
They have not discovered the ERISA remedial
indemnity agreements.
alternative to indemnity. Nor have they investigated the legislative history of
these overlooked sections of ERISA.
The reason for this situation is that the lawyers have been focusing on the
factors specified by the Supreme Court rather than concentrating on the real task
- to fathom the intent of Congress. The specified factors generally contain the
key indications of that intent that the Supreme Court seeks.
A.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

But when one steps back from the factors and examines the long historical
trend in Anglo-American jurisprudence it becomes obvious where to look for the
indication of Congressional intent.
Anglo-American jurisprudence first
recognized contribution and indemnity by enforcing contribution and indemnity
agreements. 349 It was only later that the courts implied the agreement through
quasi-contracts and finally implied the action without any semblance of an
agreement. 350 The courts and commentators are at this third stage, allowing the

implication without an agreement, in their hunt for the Congressional intent
concerning contribution and indemnity for ERISA. Since Congress never got
past the first stage, allowing the action only by agreement, these courts and
commentators have been left to grasp at figments of their imaginations. Instead,
they should focus on that first stage. Congress did make a pronouncement for
that first stage in the statute. ERISA provides that no court shall enforce an
agreement relieving a fiduciary of liability. 35 1 The courts and commentators
have missed this pronouncement because they are hunting for an inkling
concerning the words "contribution" and "indemnity", not "agreement". Their
sought words are missing in the Congressional pronouncement. For some of the
courts and commentators it is even easier to 352
overlook the key word since they are
blinded by what they perceive as "fairness".
One could now focus on whether "an agreement.., to relieve a fiduciary
from.., liability" includes an agreement concerning contribution and indemnity.
345.
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One might suspect that contribution and indemnity allow liability for one's share
of liability. The counter, of course, would be that the ERISA co-fiduciary
provisions make one fiduciary liable for the acts of others whose acts the cofiduciary knew about but failed to correct. So any form of relief, whether
proportionate by contribution or not, would relieve the fiduciary from liability.
That this is the proper conclusion is further supported by noting the
historical trend in the tort-related fields. The Supreme Court refuses to implicate
contribution and indemnity for statutes designed to punish wrongdoers, such as
anti-trust violators and commodity fraud schemes.353 ERISA has a similar
background. It arose out of scandals of wrong-doing with multi-employer plans
and the failure of disclosure statutes to stem the wrongdoing. 354 Clearly,
Congress sought something stronger than the securities law disclosure
approach. 355 That something was specter of liability for the acts of cofiduciaries, unless the fiduciary took action to correct the co-fiduciary breach.356
So Congress crafted the penalty.
B. COMPORT WITH ERISA's LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Congress, however, did not stop at one pronouncement concerning the
matter. The legislative history indicates that Congress did worry that such total
liability might be too much.3 57 As a result ERISA itself provides the relief. A
court should not destroy this ERISA relief with a parallel system of contribution
and indemnity. The Congressional relief was to allow plans, fiduciaries, and
employers to purchase insurance for their liabilities. 358 Every first-year law
student is taught in torts that the function of liability insurance is to spread the
costs of a risk.359 Liability insurance provides this spreading effect essentially by
providing that all insureds pay an annual premium. Those insureds suffering the
impact of the risk that year receive the insurance benefits. The other insureds,
having avoided the impact of the risk, receive nothing. The net effect is that
everyone pays a little for the disaster, and the victim of the disaster receives
compensation. Insurance companies can calculate the premiums from historical
data to insure the little paid by all covers the benefit payments and overhead, less
earnings on the moneys in the interim.
If all fiduciaries purchased their own insurance, or refused to serve until the
employer purchased their insurance, then courts by allowing contribution and

353. See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 204-17 and accompanying text.
355. See Louis D. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY AND How THE BANKERS USE IT 92
(Frederick A. Stokes Co., 1913). "Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most
efficient policeman." LARRY D. SODERQUIST & THERESA A. GABALDON, SECURITIES REGULATION 2-

3 (Foundation Press, 4th ed. 1999). New Deal program for the securities statutes passed in 1933 and
1934 was disclosure rather than merit regulation. Id.
356. See supra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
357. See supra notes 153-68 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 153-68 and accompanying text; but see Emmons.v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y Of the United States, 799 F. Supp. 1123, 1128 (D. N.M. 1992) (rejecting the argument that
insurance is the only Congressional method of relief from liability).
359. See, e.g., Robert Keeton, supra note 160, at 11-12 (explaining risk transferance).
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indemnity interfere with the Congressional risk allocation system. They also
cast aside the Congressional goal of minimizing costs to plans by adding the
additional costs of litigation to determine the proportional amount of liability for
contribution or whether the requirements of unjust enrichment for indemnity had
been met. In other words, contribution and indemnity are only of use to
fiduciaries who failed to get insurance, or tail insurance when their terms as
fiduciaries expired.
C. COMPORT WITH

ERISA's PURPOSES

Perhaps the courts should cooperate in driving these uninsured fiduciaries
out of serving as fiduciaries on ERISA plans. The ERISA prudent standard is
that of an expert.360 One reason for the variations of ERISA trust law from
traditional trust law deal with the enormous amounts of moneys. 36' To protect
participant expectations Congress requires professional fiduciaries, either one
that has sufficient assets to support the liability such as a bank or insurance
company or one with enough business experience to not accept an ERISA
fiduciary position without the proper insurance, which also has the effect of
providing sufficient moneys to support the liability.
To further protect these participant expectations, Congress requires that
ERISA fiduciaries monitor each other's activities.3 62 Congress fractionalized the
ERISA fiduciaries to insure legions of monitors.3 63 Congress designed the cofiduciary liability rules to insure a motive to monitor. The only relaxation of
these incentives is the insurance provision, designed to spread the risk through
insurance premiums. The Department of Labor has allowed liability relieving
agreements to the same extent that would have been provided by that insurance.
For a court to allow implied contribution and agreement upsets this craftily,
Congressionally-designed risk allocation.
V. CONCLUSION
Congress in designing ERISA created a scheme considerably different from
traditional trust law. Retirement plans involve large numbers of participants,
large amounts of money, and fiduciaries with inherent conflicts of interest,
receiving benefits or fees from the plan. Faced with plans looted by their
fiduciaries, Congress determined to raise the standards of behavior for these
fiduciaries above that of contract law to that of traditional trust law. Then
Congress set up a policing system to insure that a particular fiduciary no longer
could loot plans without detection. That policing system requires two main
elements: (1) professional fiduciaries and (2) fiduciary monitoring of other
fiduciaries. Those provisions of ERISA setting the standard of the expert
prudent person provides the motive for non-professional fiduciaries to leave the
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field, or at least seek expert advice. Those provisions of ERISA creating cofiduciary liability, imputing the liability of the feasor to an otherwise innocent
co-fiduciary, set up the motive for fiduciaries to observe the actions of other
fiduciaries. The fiduciaries seeking court implied contribution and indemnity in
the scenario commencing this article failed in their monitoring duties. They had
specified recorded deeds, yet never sought to make sure those fiduciaries
charged with that task actually did as directed.
Fearing that the monitoring and expert duties might impose too much
liability on a particular fiduciary, Congress considered the possibility of
amelioration through contribution and indemnity. The result was the exculpation
and insurance provisions of ERISA. The exculpation provisions generally
banned indemnity except in limited circumstances. The insurance provisions
generally allowed a type of contribution, if the plan paid the premiums. These
provisions negate the conclusions of the courts and commentators that ERISA
has no provisions on contribution and indemnity. And they most certainly
negate any assertion that Congress did not consider contribution and indemnity
in the ERISA context. The fiduciaries seeking court implied contribution and
indemnity in the scenario commencing this article failed to obtain that insurance.
That failure risks lesser payments to the plan for the damage done, if the
fiduciaries no longer have sufficient assets for the plan to levy against.
The system set up by Congress is not only a reticulated remedial scheme,
but it relates to contribution and indemnity. In these situations, the Supreme
Court has always followed the Congressional scheme and denied court implied
contribution and indemnity. One might suggest that a court may allow court
implied contribution and indemnity to the extent provided by agreement between
the parties authorized in the ERISA provisions. But this would violate the
Congressional scheme. That scheme is the parties to private pension plans, not
only have the power to specify the plan terms within the parameters set forth in
ERISA, but also have the power to allocate liabilities amongst themselves. If
they fail to so allocate, the courts should not second guess their decisions,
especially when it involves additional litigation costs to determine the amount of
such liability and whether the court should impose such liability.

